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EMPLOYEE SAY-ON-PAY:  MONITORING AND LEGITIMIZING 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION  
 
 






This Article proposes the adoption of employee say-on-pay in 
corporate governance. The board would benefit from an advisory vote of 
employees on executive compensation. This proposal is based on two 
considerations: firstly, the benefits of better monitoring and reduced 
agency cost in corporate governance; secondly, the link between executive 
compensation and income inequity and wealth disparity in the broader 
economy.  
If adopted, shareholders and employees would monitor executive 
performance and pay at different levels. Shareholders through the market 
mechanism can only monitor at the level of public disclosures and share 
price. Employees can leverage private information. Non-executive 
managers in particular can better monitor the company and senior 
executives, based on inside knowledge and a longer term horizon, than 
diffuse, diversified, and short durational shareholders. Employees 
collectively possess the corporation’s entire information content; the 
assessment derived there from would be relevant to the board’s 
assessment of executive performance and pay.  
On the level of political economy, employee approval would 
legitimate executive pay in the current social, economic, and political 
environment in which executive compensation and income disparities 
have touched public consciousness. Executive compensation is no longer 
purely a matter of private contracting. Prominent economists have linked 
excessive pay to economic inequity, a pressing issue of public 
consciousness today. Employees are a major constituent of the corporate 
system and our political society. They can act as surrogate public monitors 
and perform a gatekeeping function of good corporate governance. 
                                                                                                                                     
†  John H. and Mary Lou Dasburg Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin 
College of Law; Professor, Johns Hopkins Carey Business School. I thank the many 
colleagues who read this paper and provided helpful comments.  
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Structured properly and achieved fairly as to the executive, employee say-
on-pay would politically legitimate executive compensation and income 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Executive compensation started to rise significantly in the 1980s, and 
the 1990s experienced explosive growth that rapidly outpaced the pay of 
the corporate and broader American workforce.1 Executive compensation 
is one of the most controversial topics in corporate governance. 2  The 
absolute amount of pay has created wide income disparity between top 
executives and the average worker. 3  The pay problem has created a 
shared perception that pay is decoupled from performance and a broad 
sense of social equity. The legitimacy and efficacy of the corporate 
governance system are in question. Executive pay affects both firm 
efficiency and social equity in a market society. Compensation influences 
incentives, which affects production and wealth allocation. A prevailing 
public sense that wages are not fairly allocated affects morale and social 
cohesion at both the firm and the societal levels.4 Prominent economists 
have identified executive compensation as a “powerful force” 5  for 
economic inequitable and social “exploitation” 6  of wealth allocation 
                                                                                                                                     
1  See Lawrence Mishel & Natalie Sabadish, CEO Pay and the Top 1%: How Executive 
Compensation and Financial-Sector Pay Have Fueled Income Inequality, ECONOMIC POLICY 
INSTITUTE, Issue Brief #331, at 6 fig. A (May 2, 2012) (showing historical growth of CEO 
pay as a multiple of average worker pay since 1965); Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, 
Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005, 23 REV. OF 
FIN. STUDIES 2099 (2010) (showing that compensation was flat from 1940s to 1970s, but 
that pay became more correlated to shareholder wealth since the 1980s).  
2  See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (criticizing executive 
compensation practices). 
3  See Steven N. Kaplan & Josua Rauh, Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes 
to the Rise in the Highest Incomes?, 23 REV. OF FIN. STUDIES 1004 (2010) (identifying 
executive compensation as one major source of the increasing income disparity seen in 
the last several decades) 
4  See ROBERT W. KOLB, TOO MUCH IS NOT ENOUGH: INCENTIVES IN EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION 162 (2012) (arguing that “there is a growing awareness of the potential for 
rising inequity to seriously corrode social cohesion”); William Lazonick, Why Executive 
Pay Matters to Innovation and Inequity, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 
LABOR, AND FINANCE CAPITALISM 415 (eds. Cynthia Williams and Peer Zumbansen, 2011) 
(arguing that manipulation of executive pay has resulted in economic inequity, reduced 
innovation, and unstable economic performance).  
5  THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 334 (2014).    
6  “In a more careful, academic way of putting it I would say that one of the 
explanations of what is going on is increased exploitation. You see the ratio of wages to 
productivity going way down, and that certainly is consistent with increased exploitation. 
And you see that the ratio of CEO pay to worker pay has gone up. So what I would say is 
that some of the explanations have to do with weakened worker bargaining power, 
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through the abuse of corporate power.7 Concentrated wealth affects the 
working of the larger economy and social welfare.8 Business scholars have 
called for a “new paradigm” on executive compensation. 9  Given this 
business, economic, and political reality, the current controversy over the 
compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs) will not recede into a 
private corner of corporate governance with the passage of time unless the 
problem is fixed.  
Executive compensation has entered a new era. Until a few years ago, 
compensation was not regulated in any meaningful way. It was a matter 
of private contracting for the employment of the top corporate officer. The 
Dodd-Frank Act now regulates CEO pay across U.S. public companies. 
                                                                                                                                     
weaker unions, asymmetric state liberalization where capital moves but labor can’t move, 
corporate governance laws that provide relatively little check on abuses of corporate 
power by CEOs, and an increase of monopoly power because of network externalities.” 
Lynn Parramore, Joseph Stiglitz on Why the Rich Are Getting Richer -- and Why It Could Get 
Much Worse, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 19, 2014) (quoting Stiglitz), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lynn-parramore/joseph-stiglitz-on-why-
th_b_6354948.html.  
7  See PIKETTY, supra note 5, at 334 (“[T]he extremely generous rewards meted out to 
top managers can be a powerful force for divergence of the wealth distribution: if the best 
paid individuals set their power salaries, (at least to some extent), the result may be 
greater and greater inequity.”); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW 
TODAY'S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 66-67 (2013) (providing an account of 
income inequity in the U.S. and asserting excessive executive pay as one of the causes); 
Mishel & Sabadish, supra note 1 (arguing that executive compensation and financial-
sector pay have caused income inequity). 
8  The credit rating agency, Standard & Poor’s, has warned of the serious 
consequences of income inequity, which has been factored into bottom line projection of 
economic growth: “At extreme levels, income inequality can harm sustained economic 
growth over long periods. The U.S. is approaching that threshold. Standard & Poor's sees 
extreme income inequality as a drag on long-run economic growth. We've reduced our 
10-year U.S. growth forecast to a 2.5% rate. We expected 2.8% five years ago.” Joe 
Maguire, How Increasing Inequity Is Dampening U.S. Economic Growth, and Possible Ways to 
Change the Tide, GLOBAL CREDIT PORTAL (S&P Capital IQ, Aug. 5, 2014), available at 
https://www.globalcreditportal.com/ratingsdirect/renderArticle.do?articleId=1351366
&SctArtId=255732&from=CM&nsl_code=LIME&sourceObjectId=8741033&sourceRevId=
1&fee_ind=N&exp_date=20240804-19:41:13.  According to the World Bank, the 2013 GDP 
of the United States was $16.768 trillion. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_20
13+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc. A 0.3% decline in economic 
growth from 2.8% to 2.5% would imply a reduction in GDP of $50 billion per annum 
based on the 2013 GDP figure.  
9  See Jay W. Lorsch & Rakesh Khurana, The Pay Problem: Time for a New Paradigm for 
Executive Compensation, in THE FUTURE OF BOARDS: MEETING THE GOVERNANCE 
CHALLENGES OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 77 (2012).  
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The statute mandates third-party review of the compensation package, 
which is shareholder say-on-pay.10 Since this reform measure is fairly new, 
its efficacy remains to be seen in the years to come.11  Irrespective of 
whether most voting outcomes approve proposed pay packages (the short 
but predictable experience thus far), shareholder say-on-pay is a good 
thing because shareholders now have a legal right to participate in the pay 
decision. Their opinion is relevant to the board’s deliberation, and more 
relevant information is better than less in informed decisionmaking. 
Shareholder monitoring may prove to have longterm salutary effects.  
Yet even as the ink is drying on the Dodd-Frank Act, the limits of 
shareholder monitoring are well known. Many diffused, diversified, and 
short durational shareholders in modern capital markets are rationally 
disengaged from corporate governance.12 Furthermore, shareholders are 
one of many contractual constituents of the firm.13 One conception of a 
firm is a “nexus of contracts” among various factors of production.14 This 
nexus includes not only top level officers and the board, but also non-
executive managers and rank and file employees who contribute to the 
production function of the firm. 15  However, the framework of U.S. 
corporate governance as practiced assumes that employees are simply 
contractual workers hired to produce widgets as directed by corporate 
managers in a top-down hierarchy. This assumption would dismiss a 
potentially important benefit that could be gained. As a group, employees 
                                                                                                                                     
10  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1899 (2010).  
11  See Randall S. Thomas et al., The First Year of Say-on-Pay Under Dodd-Frank: An 
Empirical Analysis and Look Forward, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 967 (2013) (providing 
preliminary empirical data on voting results); Randall S. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank’s Say 
On Pay: Will It Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1213 (2012) (same).   
12  See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 390-400 (1986) (discussing the 
problem of the rationally apathetic shareholder); Edward S. Adams, Bridging the Gap 
Between Ownership and Control, 34 J. CORP. L. 409, 422 (2009) (noting that increasing 
shareholder involvement is difficult because “the common shareholder today only has a 
minimal financial interest in numerous different corporations”).  
13  See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 384 (1937). See also Michael 
Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 35 (1976) 
(“There is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts) 
between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor, material and capital inputs 
and the consumers of output.”).  
14  Jensen & Meckling, supra note 13.  
15  See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247  (1999); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information 
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).  
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possess all of the information content of the company.16 This obvious fact 
is something that cannot be claimed by shareholders or an efficient capital 
market where only publicly disclosed information is incorporated into the 
stock price. Thus, employees possess the capability to assess the 
performance of the corporation and CEO.   
This Article proposes extending the say-on-pay device to employees. 
The advisory votes of shareholders and employees can provide important 
and different information to the board. Two distinct benefits inure from a 
right of employees to participate in pay decisions. From a microeconomic 
perspective of the firm, employees have great incentive to monitor the 
company and have private information relevant to the performance of the 
company and its senior executives. This collective incentive and 
information should be leveraged. From a political economic perspective, 
employee say-on-pay would politically legitimate executive compensation. 
This aspect is important because executive compensation is no longer a 
purely private matter akin to contracting for the labor of most other 
employees. One significant factor in growing economic inequity is high 
executive compensation. 17  The political and economic dimensions of 
permitting employee voice in executive compensation are significant.18 
Employees would act as surrogate public monitors of executive pay and 
gatekeepers of good corporate governance in this regard.19  
This is the first scholarly article proposing employee say-on-pay.20 
The idea here may be viewed as controversial, or perhaps even radical, 
                                                                                                                                     
16  See PHILLIP PHAN, TAKING BACK THE BOARDROOM: THRIVING AS A 21ST-CENTURY 
DIRECTOR 3 (2007) (“There is increasingly realization that a firm is a place where people 
meet to exchange specific information for the purpose of engaging in production.”).  
17  See STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 66-67; PIKETTY, supra note 5, at 334.  
18  See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 75-105 (1970) (analyzing the economic relationship 
between participatory voice and loyalty).  
19  See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006); Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. 
REV. 916 (1998).  
20  Upon researching for preemption, I came across two brief references to the 
possibility of employees say on executive pay in the popular press. See Justin Fox, Who 
Should Actually Have Say on Pay?, HBR BLOG NETWORK (May 30, 2013) (“If we wanted to 
have a real impact on executive pay levels, we should probably have employees vote.”) 
(emphasis in original), available at http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/05/who-should-actually-
have-say-on-pay/; Deborah Hargreaves, Employees Need a Say on Executive Pay, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 9, 2012) (“That is why we believe employees need more of a say on 
pay.”). Cf. Gretchen Morgenson, Employees, Too, Want a Say on the Boss’s Pay, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 21, 2012) (suggesting that employee-shareholders in ESOPs should have say-on-
pay).  
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since American corporate governance revolves around the triad of board, 
management, and shareholder. Among these constituents, management, 
at least, will not view employee say-on-pay warmly. Employees have little 
formal role in U.S. corporate governance under corporation law.21 The 
tension between these principles and the proposal here is more apparent 
than real. The proposal is consistent with one of the most fundamental 
tenet of corporate governance, which is informed decisionmaking at the 
board level. The controversy of the idea would be political in nature.22 
While political consideration is important, it is only one facet of the nature 
of the problem, and a separate inquiry from whether the idea is 
economically and legally sound. Furthermore, since say-on-pay is a global 
corporate governance phenomenon, originating in the United Kingdom 
and rapidly adopted by many economically advanced countries in Europe 
before landing on American shores, the idea of employee say-on-pay 
should be put on the agenda of the global debate on pay, including in 
countries where employees traditionally have had greater participatory 
role in the governance of the corporation.23 
To frame the analysis that follows, a few prefatory comments are 
warranted. This Article is about institutional design. It is not written to 
advance a broader agenda of expanding employee role in American 
corporate governance from nothing to something, or comingling labor and 
corporation laws.24 This proposal is instrumental, advancing the use of an 
established governance device to better monitor senior executives, which 
                                                                                                                                     
21  See Harry W. Arthurs & Claire Mummé, From Governance to Political Economy: 
Insights from a Study of Relations Between Corporations and Workers, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOR, AND FINANCE CAPITALISM 350 (eds. Cynthia Williams 
and Peer Zumbansen, 2011) (“The presumption is that workers will not participate in the 
making of important decisions, including many which directly and dramatically affect 
their interests.”); MARGARET M. BLAIR & MARK J. ROE, EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 2 (1999) (“Labor directly influences corporate governance structures in the 
United States less than it does is [sic] in some other countries.”). See generally GREGORY K. 
DOW, GOVERNING THE FIRM: WORKERS’ CONTROL IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2003) 
(analyzing employees’ role in corporate governance); BLAIR & ROE (same); MICHAEL 
LOWER, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE: A LEGAL AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS (2010) 
(same). In Europe, employees have a greater role in corporate governance. See Blair & 
Roe, at 163-313 (discussing the German and Japanese models).  
22  See infra Section IV.E (discussing the political objection of the executive class).  
23  European countries use employee participation in corporate governance more 
than the US model. See ROE & BLAIR, at 163-238.  
24  Some scholars have sought to explore greater role for employees in formal 
corporate governance. See Brett H. McDonnell, Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate 
Governance, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 429 (2011); Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or 
Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334 (2008).  
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is a basic function of corporate governance. The basic premise of the 
Article is that there is a problem of excessive compensation, and the 
problem arises from failed arm’s length bargaining between the board and 
the CEO. 25 The questions explored here are whether the concept of say-
on-pay can be extended to other third-party constituents, and whether the 
benefits of such a device outweigh potential problems. The logical force of 
the proposal is apparent if one acknowledges, as one must, that 
employees possess the corporation’s entire information content and this 
information is relevant to the board’s decision on performance and pay. 
This Article is written in four sections. Section I provides brief 
background information on shareholder say-on-pay as mandated by the 
Dodd-Frank Act. It discusses the empirical data on shareholder voting 
results, and identifies the recurrent problem of rational shareholder 
apathy. Section II proposes the concept of employee say-on-pay and 
discusses the scheme’s structure and implementation. The most intricate 
issue of implementation is how votes should be allocated to meet the twin 
goals of firm efficiency and social equity. Second III identifies the benefits 
of employee say-on-pay, including monitoring and modulating executive 
compensation and decreasing income and wealth disparity in American 
society. Section IV discusses potential objections to the proposal, including 
whether the informational input would be reliable and whether employee 
say-on-pay would tilt the balance in corporate governance away from 
shareholders to employees.  
 
I.  SHAREHOLDER SAY-ON-PAY 
 
A.  The Problem of Executive Pay          
 
For much of the twentieth century, CEOs were paid well relative to 
other corporate workers, but according to some business scholars they 
were paid on scale suggesting senior “bureaucrats.” 26  Commentators, 
                                                                                                                                     
25  BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 23-44. See Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, 
Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers’ 
Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 846, 847-48 (2011) (noting that “the belief that the 
American executive compensation system works well is a distinctly minority position”). 
26  Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Note How Much You 
Pay, But How, HARVARD BUS. REV. (May-June 1990). See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. 
Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990) 
(hypothesizing that market and political forces impose constraints that reduce 
performance incentives). However, even Jensen and Murphy have recently recognized 
that executive compensation schemes today are seriously flawed. See Kevin J. Murphy & 
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primarily in business and economics, suggested that contracts should be 
optimized to reduce agency cost, thereby justifying and leading to greater 
compensation as incentive for superior company performance.27 In the 
1990s, CEO pay experienced an explosive growth and compensation levels 
have since remained at high levels relative to worker pay.28 This growth 
has level off in the past several years, but what remains after the “big bang” 
in executive compensation is a new status quo in which top corporate 
executives are routinely paid wages that are several hundred times the 
pay of average workers.  
Numerous studies have empirically documented the rapid rise of 
executive compensation. The following are data from one such study 




According to this study, the ratio of CEO and worker compensation 
has grown in constant dollar terms at a steady pace since 1973 and 1989. In 
1973, the ratio of CEO to worker pay was 22.6x, and with a 5.5% real 
growth rate the ratio in 2011 was 241.4x. This growth in wage disparity 
                                                                                                                                     
Michael C. Jensen, CEO Bonus Plans: And How to Fix Them, draft paper dated Nov. 19, 
2011, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1935654.  
27  See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 26.  
28  See STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 66-67.  
29  Mishel & Sabadish, supra note 1, at 5 tbl. 2. I calculated the annual growth rate 
data based on the study’s information. Other studies and sources have shown slightly 
different numbers, but all show the same general trend and levels of high ratios of CEO 
pay. See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 296 n.12, 309 n.88 (providing citations to other 
sources and data); Lorsch & Khurana, supra note 9, at 79 (showing ratio of average CEO 
pay to average worker pay growing from 44:1 in 1980 to 344:1 in 2007).  
Year













1965 791,000               38,500            20.5 511         5,278      
1973 1,033,000            45,800            22.6 451         3,881      
1978 1,413,000            47,600            29.7 282         2,411      
1989 2,631,000            44,000            59.8 525         4,081      
1995 5,570,000            43,600            127.8 737         6,120      
2000 19,482,000          45,900            424.4 1,730      13,006    
2007 17,919,000          48,400            370.2 1,487      13,268    
2011 12,141,000          50,300            241.4 1,268      11,958    
Annual growth 
rate 1973-2011
 6.7%  0.2%  6.4%  2.8%  3.0%
Annual growth 
rate 1989-2012
 7.2%  0.6%  6.5%  4.1%  5.0%
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reflects the growth of executive compensation that in the period between 
1973 and 2011 has outpaced worker pay by a factor of 33.  The growth in 
CEO pay has outpaced the growth in the stock market as measured by the 
S&P and Dow indices by a factor of two. Executive pay cannot be 
explained by marginal productivity gains attributable to actions of senior 
executives. 30 
Executive pay packages were ordinarily matters of internal corporate 
governance and private contracting, a closed world of boards, executives, 
and their advisers.  As pay packages have exploded in the past several 
decades and manipulations of compensation have been exposed, 
compensation has become a controversial public issue. Perhaps the most 
infamous recent episodes involved the outsized pay package of a former 
president of the Walt Disney Company for essentially several months of 
ineffective work,31 and the “retention bonuses” for Wall Street investment 
bankers even as they were responsible for causing great economic damage 
to their firms and the global economy.32 A recent study shows that many 
corporations pay their CEOs more than they paid federal income taxes.33 
                                                                                                                                     
30  See STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 21 (“It strains credulity to think that over the 
intervening years CEOs as a group have increased their productivity so much, relative to 
the average worker, that a multiple of more than 200 could be justified. Indeed, the 
available data on the success of U.S. companies provide no support for such a view.”); 
PIKETTY, supra note 5, at 334 (“The most convincing proof of the failure of corporate 
governance and of the absence of a rational productivity justification for extremely high 
executive pay is that when we collect data about individual firms (which we can do for 
publicly owned corporations in all the rich countries), it is very difficult to explain the 
observed variations in terms of firm performance.”); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil 
Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are, 116 
QUARTERLY J. ECON. 901 (2001) (finding that CEO pay in fact responds as much to a lucky 
dollar as to a general dollar” where luck is defined as factors of firm performance that are 
outside of the CEO’s control).  
31  See In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006) (“In 
December 1996, only fourteen months after he commenced employment, [Michael] Ovitz 
was terminated without cause, resulting in a severance payout to Ovitz valued at 
approximately $130 million.”). This litigation was widely followed in the media. See, e.g., 
Jonathan D. Glater, Big Pay Packages May Fade After Ruling on Ex-President of Disney, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2005).  
32  See Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, A.I.G. Planning Huge Bonuses After $170 
Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2009). The banks were so embarrassed to called the 
payouts “performance bonus” that they were instead called “retention bonus.” STIGLITZ, , 
supra note 5, at 79.  
33  Scott Klinger & Sarah Anderson, Fleecing Uncle Sam: A Growing Number of 
Corporations Spend More on Executive Compensation than Federal Income Taxes, Institute for 
Policy Studies and Center for Effective Government (2014), available at http://www.ips-
dc.org/fleecing-uncle-sam/. The report finds that 7 of the top 30 American corporations 
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There is evidence that even basic corporate financial decisions such as 
payout policy have been improperly affected by the effects of retention of 
earnings, payment of dividends, and repurchases of stock on the CEO’s 
wealth as tied to the compensation package that includes stock and 
options.34  
Such episodes have come to symbolize conspicuous compensation35 
in an era of great economic inequity.36 Although most issues of corporate 
governance involving technical and arcane legal rules applied by an 
insular group of boards, the corporate bar, and mostly Delaware courts, 
the issue of executive compensation has become a public issue.37 Public 
consciousness of corporate governance rises from a conspicuous crisis, as 
was the case with the governance failures at the turn of the new century 
resulting in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the financial crisis of 2008-2009 
resulting in the Dodd-Frank Act.  
There are two broad camps of thought on executive compensation. 
The first is the “optimal contracting” camp, which has argued that 
contracting for compensation works well and that the levels of 
compensation seen are the product of market pricing for executive 
                                                                                                                                     
paid their CEOs more than they paid federal income taxes, and that 29 of the 100 highest-
paid CEOs received more in pay than their company paid in federal income taxes. Id. at 1.  
34  See Philipp Geiler & Luc Renneboog, Executive Remuneration and the Payout 
Decision (2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2436343 (discussing the effects of 
compensation manipulation on payout policy); Lazonick, supra note 4, at 424-37 
(discussing the use of stock buybacks to manipulate compensation). See, e.g., Ryan v. 
Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del.Ch. 2007) (involving back dating of stock option grants); Weiss 
v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433 (Del.Ch. 2008) (involving “spring-loaded” stock option grants 
in which options were granted immediate prior to favorable press announcement).  
35  Cf. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1899) (observing in the 
Gilded Age that the wealthy class demonstrates their status through “conspicuous 
consumption”).  
36  See PIKETTY, supra note 5; Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequity in 
the United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data (Oct. 2014), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2526356; Forget the 1%: It is the 
0.01% Who are Really Getting Ahead in America, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 8, 2014); Robert 
Frank, Another Widening Gap: The Haves vs. the Have-Mores, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2014); 
Steven Rattner, Inequity, Unbelievably, Gets Worse, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2014).  
37  See Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1013 (2013) 
(arguing that public scrutiny of corporate governance arises when the ordinary private 
ordering of corporate governance fails and that “[d]ecisions about governance move from 
Wall Street to Main Street” as a result).  
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talent.38 The second is the “board capture” camp, which has argued that 
contracting has been undermined by failure of the board to monitor CEO 
performance and compensation. The most powerful advocates of this 
criticism have been Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.39  
The scope of this Article is not to analyze or rehash these arguments. 
After a deluge of academic analyses, a general consensus, constituting a 
collective wisdom, has been reached that there is a problem with 
executive compensation. 40  The optimal contracting camp occupies a 
distinctly minority position today.41    
This Article assumes the consensus view. It is premised on the view 
that the practice of executive compensation has failed, resulting in 
economically inefficient and socially inequitable results. Bebchuk and 
Fried have powerfully argued that the board and the CEO do not bargain 
at arm’s length for compensation, and that CEOs have significant power 
and influence over the setting of his or her compensation.42 The observed 
result over the past several decades has been a failure of contracting, a 
decoupling of pay and performance, and excessive compensation. Due to 
managerial power and position, CEOs collect large economic rents.43 In a 
                                                                                                                                     
38  See John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S. CEO Compensation 
Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1160 (2005) (espousing 
“optimal contracting theory, which posits that contracts are designed to maximize 
shareholder value net of contracting costs and transactions costs”); JONATHAN R. MACEY, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 23 (2008) (“The specific 
executive compensation arrangements that we actually observe, however, simply reflect 
the result of a bargaining process between shareholders’ elected representatives and 
managers.”). Some commentators have even suggested that compensation levels in some 
cases may be too low. See Steven Kaplan, Are U.S. CEOs Overpaid?, 22 ACADEMY OF 
MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES 5, 6 (2008) (“It is possible that good CEOs are not overpaid, 
but underpaid.”). But see James P. Walsh, CEO Compensation and the Responsibilities of the 
Business Scholar to Society, 22 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES 26, 32-33 (2008) 
(arguing that Kaplan based his analysis on a “selective reading of the available 
evidence”). 
39  BEBCHUK & FREID, supra note 2, at 23-44, 61-86.  
40  See Sorapop Kiatpongsan & Michael I. Norton, How Much (More) Should CEOs 
Make? A Universal Desire for More Equal Pay, (forthcoming in Perspectives in Psychological 
Science) (showing that most people, regardless of nationality, share similar beliefs on 
executive compensation and that their estimates are much lower than the actual 
amounts executives make). See also Gretchen Gavett, CEOs Get Paid Too Much, According 
to Pretty Much Everyone, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (Sept. 23, 2014) (providing a 
summary of Kiatpongsan and Norton’s paper).  
41  Thomas & Wells, supra note 25, at 848.  
42  BEBCHUK & FREID, supra note 2, at 23-44, 61-86.  
43  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and 
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002); 
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pre-Dodd-Frank era, Bebechuk and Fried argued that shareholders and 
the markets have limited influence curbing excessive pay.44 Their criticism 
has remained durable even in a post-Dodd-Frank era of shareholder say-
on-pay.  
However, the premise of this Article goes beyond the Bebchuk and 
Fried argument. Bebchuk has been a leading advocate of shareholder-
centrism.45 Advocates of shareholder primacy do not connect the role of 
executive compensation to the broader problem of economic inequity. 
Their concern is the maximization of shareholder wealth. Presumably 
much of the din of the “board capture” camp would go silent if the 
current compensation levels were strongly connected to shareholder 
wealth. The connection between executive pay and income inequity 
should be made because this aspect of corporate governance imposes 
broad externalities beyond senior executives and shareholders. 46  The 
problem of executive compensation is not just an issue of allocating 
wealth between senior executives and shareholders. There is a larger 
question of social equity: that is, the distribution of the gains resulting in 
excessively large allocations to a small handful of senior executives even 
though production in a corporation is always a collective endeavor among 
many factors of production, including employees. Distribution and 
efficiency are connected.47  
Excessive compensation poses political and economic questions 
beyond the immediate microeconomic concerns of agency cost and 
monitoring and their impact on shareholder value. With that said, 
shareholder primacy and social equity may not be binary choices. The 
most efficient outcomes for shareholders may be lower compensation 
                                                                                                                                     
STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 65 (“One of the interpretations of these data is that in effect, 
during the periods when wages grew so much slower than productivity, corporate 
managers seized a larger share of the ‘rents’ associated with corporations.”). Economic 
rent is derived “from the strategic advantage that management possesses in the 
distribution of the returns to monopoly power.” Oliver E. Williamson, Managerial 
Discretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 1032, 1035 (1963).  
44  BEBCHUK & FREID, supra note 2, at 45-58.  
45  See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of Shareholder Francise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007); 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 
(2005). 
46  See STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 66-67; PIKETTY, supra note 5, at 334. 
47  See Amartya Sen, Does Business Ethics Make Economic Sense?, 3 BUS. ETHICS 
QUARTERLY 45 (1993) (arguing that distribution can affect production). On the 
macroeconomic level, distribution can also affect efficiency. Based on increased inequity 
of wealth distribution, Standard & Poor’s has lowered the growth forecast of the US 
economy. Supra note 8.  
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levels for senior executives on the whole. 48  This outcome would suit 
shareholders and employees alike and would tend to make income and 
wealth distributions more equitable across the corporation and society 
since shareholders hold wealth across a much broader spectrum of society 
than the class of senior executives. Income inequity is a major facet of the 
controversy over executive compensation even though it is not a priority 
of the shareholder-centric “board capture” school of thought. This Article 
acknowledges the connection between corporate governance and income 
inequity.  
 
B.  Limits of Delaware Corporation Law               
 
When discussing a failure of an aspect of corporate governance, some 
may consider the font of reform to lie in state corporation law.49 This 
thought is more hopeful than real.50 There are impediments to any serious 
reform through state corporation law.  
First is the problem of politics and money. Delaware reigns supreme 
in corporation law, particularly for public corporations where the problem 
of compensation is most acute.51 Delaware law is regarded as a kind of a 
quasi-national corporation law, and its judiciary enjoys its well-earned 
reputation as preeminent corporate jurists. This expertise is a competitive 
advantage for the state and generates significant revenue. 52  Since 
meaningful reform of compensation would most likely result in systemic 
decrease in executive compensation, any semblance of real reform in 
Delaware would run the real risk of a “compensation run” to other 
jurisdictions by those holding the managerial power to make these 
decisions. Management will want to avoid jurisdictions that will actively 
scrutinize the grant of compensation. There would be literally millions of 
                                                                                                                                     
48  See BEBCHUK & FREID, supra note 2 (criticizing the aggregate dollar values of 
compensation).  
49  See, e.g., Thomas & Wells, supra note 25 (focusing on the fiduciary duty of officers 
in the contracting process); Lisa M. Fairfax, Sue on Pay: Say on Pay’s Impact on Directors’ 
Fiduciary Duties, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2013) (focusing on negative say-on-pay votes as a 
basis for fiduciary obligations of boards).  
50  See BEBCHUK & FREID, supra note 2, at 45-46 (arguing that “judicial review has 
failed to impose any meaningful constraints on executive pay”) 
51  See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate 
Law?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1775, 1810 (2002) (noting that over half of all public companies 
that incorporate in the United States incorporate in Delaware). 
52  See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Shrinking Half-Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 125 (2009) 
(discussing Delaware’s revenue from corporation law); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Poltics, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (2005) (same).  
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reasons to forsake Delaware. Nothing is more immediately in the self-
interest of any worker than compensation. Knowing this, the Delaware 
legislature and courts will not take action that would seriously 
compromise the state’s franchise.53  
With this perspective in mind, Delaware courts have applied the 
traditional doctrines of fiduciary duty, business judgment rule, and 
corporate waste to review compensation cases. This framework gives a 
board virtually unfettered discretion to award whatever compensation it 
decides54 absent culpable conduct arising from disloyalty, bad faith, bad 
process, faulty disclosure, waste, or outright fraud.55 As long as a board 
makes an informed decision in good faith and shareholders were not 
deceived, the decision would be effectively bulletproof. Based on this legal 
framework, derivative suits based on negative shareholder say-on-pay 
votes have been predictably dismissed in the vast majority of cases.56  
In the past three decades as executive compensation has exploded 
and as the courts have been forced to decide bad cases (on the facts) like 
the Disney litigation57, what have courts done about the problem? No new 
doctrines have been developed to address the problem.58 Although there 
have been some historical instances in which courts have threatened 
higher scrutiny, they have returned to managerial deference as public 
dissatisfaction subsided. 59  As commentators have noted, shareholders 
                                                                                                                                     
53  On the occasion when the Delaware courts took action that was deemed 
significantly against the interests of corporate management, the legislature took 
immediate action to legislatively overrule the court. Of course, this the famous episode of 
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), and the subsequent enactment of Section 
102(b)(7) exculpation provision. See Robert J. Rhee, Fiduciary Exemption for Public Necessity: 
Shareholder Profit, Public Good, and the Hobson’s Choice during a National Crisis, 17 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 661, 682-83 (2010).    
54  See, e.g., Zucker v. Andreessen, 2012 WL 2366448 (Del.Ch. 2012) (upholding 
severance package of $40 million to a fired executive); In re Walt Disney Derivative 
Litigation, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (upholding compensation of $130 million to a fired 
executive).  
55  State corporation law is most effective as a check on executive compensation 
when there has been fraud or major defects in disclosure. See, e.g., Weiss v. Swanson, 948 
A.2d 433 (Del.Ch. 2008) (holding that the plaintiff sufficient pleaded faulty disclosure and 
corporate waste in relation to stock option manipulation); Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 
(Del.Ch. 2007) (same).  
56  See Fairfax, supra note 49, at 23-25 (describing the current state of derivative 
litigation).  
57  In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).  
58  See generally Thomas & Wells, supra note 25, at 865-80 (providing a history of case 
law on executive compensation).  
59  Id. at 879.  
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succeeded in some cases “at some stage of the litigation process.”60 This 
qualifier is important because what really matters for changing behavior 
and outcomes is liability, and the threat of liability is not really credible 
unless there is a real possibility of liability based on the theory of 
excessive compensation.61 There has been no case where a board struck 
down a compensation decision based on excessive amount.62  
From the framework of longstanding doctrine, courts are right to shy 
away from meddling in the substantive terms of the employment contract 
between the corporation and the CEO, if the contract is the product of 
actual arms-length bargaining. Judges substantially influencing specific 
contract terms such as the amount of compensation would be frowned 
upon. Courts can certainly apply their own judgment on the matter,63 but 
this contravenes long-existing pillars of corporation law of giving boards 
deference when they acted in an informed and good faith basis.64 The 
board has the authority to decide the business and affairs of the 
corporation to the board. 65  This authority necessitates the business 
judgment rule, which is a socially useful rule limiting the liability for 
officers and directors.66 Good, bad, or ugly—corporate governance under 
current standards is stuck with the decisions of boards.67 
                                                                                                                                     
60  Id. at 879-80. 
61  See Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1154 (2013) (“The ultimate source of the expressive value of 
judicial opinions is derived solely from the power to assess liability (i.e., a consultant in a 
black robe is still just a consultant).”).  
62  “[Courts] have been hampered, at least in part, by the waste doctrine and its 
inherent weaknesses, and by lack of any alternative, practicable approach to scrutinizing 
compensation.” Thomas & Wells, supra note 25, at 880. When board action fits within 
traditional theories of misconduct, such as faulty disclosure or waste, courts have acted in 
the compensation arena. See supra note 55 & infra note 80.  
63  Courts are not incompetent as an intellectual incapability to comprehend and 
analyze business judgments. See Rhee, supra note 61, at 1152 (“Despite frequent assertions, 
scholars have been rightfully skeptical of the argument that courts lack the technical 
competence to review business decisions.”).  
64  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (explaining that the business 
judgment rule “is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors . . . 
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken 
was in the best interests of the company”). See also Rhee, supra note 61, at 1140 (noting 
that rules limiting liability of shareholders and directors are two pillars of corporate law).   
65  DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b).  
66  See Rhee, supra note 63.  
67  See In re Caremark Intern. Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del.Ch. 
1996) (“[W]hether a judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision 
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Thinking within the current corporate law framework, commentators 
have suggested that a potential check on self-interested negotiation for 
compensation could be the fiduciary duty of corporate officers.68 There are 
reasons to be less sanguine about the efficacy of this route to reform. As a 
contracting counterparty to the corporation, officers are entitled to pursue 
their self-interested economic goals. Fiduciary duty cannot go so far as to 
suggest that employees and agents should be charities to the firm or that 
they have a duty to ignore their primary economic interest of vigorously 
bargaining their wage or stake.69 Even before the recent recognition of an 
officer’s fiduciary duty in Delaware, the assumption has been that officers 
were fiduciaries, and so the rise in executive compensation has occurred 
with this understanding. Public companies are required to have 
independent board members in their compensation committees. 70 
Accordingly, board independence would achieve a largely similar 
outcome as officer contracting under the halo of fiduciary duty.  
Courts are not incapable of developing new doctrines to address new 
business climates on fairly short notice. Delaware courts rapidly 
developed new doctrines to confront the new realities of the takeover and 
leveraged buyout era of the 1980s and 1990s.71 In executive compensation, 
however, there have been no similar judicial innovations to design a 
different review system tailored to the specific problem at hand.72 This has 
not been for lack of good test cases that could have served as vehicles for 
                                                                                                                                     
substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through ‘stupid’ to ‘egregious’ or 
‘irrational’, provides no ground for director liability.”).  
68  See Thomas & Wells, supra note 25 (relying on Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 
708-09 (Del. 2009)).  
69  Analogously, in partnership law, partners owe fiduciary duty that is said to be 
“[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.” Meinhard v. 
Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). But partnership law makes clear that a partner’s 
conduct does not violate fiduciary duty “merely because the partner’s conduct furthers 
the partner’s own interest.” Revised Uniform Partnership Law § 404(e).  
70  Dodd-Frank Act § 952(a). See New York Stock Exchange Listing Rule 303A.05(a) 
(“Listed companies must have a compensation committee composed entirely of 
independent directors.”).  
71  See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 828 
(Del. 1993) (applying an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny in the sale of a company); 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) 
(determining the fiduciary duty in the context of a cash buyout); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (1985) (determining the scrutiny to be applied in the context 
of management’s defensive measures in a takeover situation).  
72  Some commentators have proposed modifications to Delaware’s laws of 
fiduciary duty and judicial review. See Thomas & Wells, supra note 25; Fairfax, supra note 
49.  
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judicial action. For example, the Delaware court openly acknowledged 
that the circumstance in Disney did not display a model of corporate 
governance;73 yet bad facts were insufficient to construct a new doctrine 
specific to governance failure in compensation.  
Doctrinal innovations are possible, and the lack of them is a product 
of choice. As a state supreme court, the Delaware Supreme Court could 
set forth a bright-line rule on presumption of validity such as 
compensation that is less than 100:1 ratio between the CEO and the lowest 
paid employee and that compensation levels beyond that would be 
scrutinized under a higher standard, for example, entire fairness standard 
requiring scrutiny of the substance of the business decision.74 Or consider 
the possibility of announcing an intermediate scrutiny for severance pay 
or golden parachutes based on a multifactor reasonableness standard, 
such as the benefit to the corporation, the corporation’s ability to attract 
executive talent, the length of tenure, the quality of past service, and other 
relevant facts. Obviously, I am not proposing these rules in this Article. 
Instead, they are not absurd examples offered simply suggest the potential 
of a more thoughtful common law process in which the rule of law is 
malleable to the particular social problem at hand.75  
The point is that if Delaware wanted to do something about the 
problem, it could have done so and it has had recurring opportunities. 
One need not be a Delaware naysayer76 to believe that Delaware courts, 
                                                                                                                                     
73  See In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 32 (Del. 2006) (observing 
that the board’s “decision-making process fell short of best practices”). 
74  Such bright-line standards are more typically found in the legislative process, but 
there are prominent examples from U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence of judicially set 
quantitative limits. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We expect that 
25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the 
interest approved today.”); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) 
(“Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate, however, 
that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”).  
75  Much of Delaware corporation law, though statute originated, is developed 
through the common law process. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism 
and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1610 (2005) (“Delaware 
corporate law may be the last vestige of the 19th century common law style in America.”); 
E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law 
and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1399, 1411 (2005) (“Delaware's common law process, which places case law at the 
forefront of corporate law, is the functional equivalent of judicial legislation.”). 
76  See William L. Carey, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 
YALE L.J. 663 (1974). The question of whether corporate law is engaged in a “race to the 
bottom” or a “race to the top” has spawned a vigorous debate. Compare id. at 666 
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protecting parochial state interests, are simply not inclined to exercise its 
judicial power to reform executive compensation on a national level in a 
way that would harm the prestige and economics of the state’s 
corporation law franchise.  
Without state legislative mandate, the erection of new doctrinal 
frameworks to address executive compensation would be a bridge too far 
for the corporate bench.77 Courts would have to go outside the comfort 
zone and habits of familiar doctrines. As the Delaware chancery court 
stated, “[t]he decision as to how much compensation is appropriate to 
retain and incentivize employees, both individually and in the aggregate, 
is a core function of a board of directors exercising its business 
judgment.” 78  State corporation law is designed to give maximum 
authority and discretion to informed, non-bad faith decisions on the 
amount of the pay.79 Delaware is not a serious solution to the problem of 
excessive pay.80 This conclusion is an unremarkable observation of the 
                                                                                                                                     
(advancing the “race to the bottom” argument), with Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, 
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 255-56 (1977), 
and Ralph Winter, Private Goals and Competition Among State Legal Systems, 6 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 127, 128-30 (1982) (advancing the “race to the top” argument).  
77  In the past, Delaware courts have created new doctrines, including different 
standards of review, to address different kinds of problems in corporation law including 
the takeover arena. See, e.g., Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) 
(providing an intermediate, two-part standard to review a board’s defensive action 
against a hostile acquirer). See also William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., 
Function Over Form: A Reassessment of the Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 
56 BUS. LAW. 1287 (2001). However, the jurisprudence on compensation has shown little 
signs that Delaware courts were going take a leading role in the area of compensation by 
departing from the traditional fiduciary duty, business judgment rule, and waste 
framework.  
78  In re The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Shareholder Litig., 2011 WL 4826104 
(Del.Ch. 2011).  
79  See Lisa R. Stark, Delaware Insider: Stockholders Have a “Say on Pay” in Delaware? 
Lessons from Recent Executive Compensation Decisions, BUS. L. TODAY (Sept. 2012) 
(“Stockholders seeking to challenge compensation decisions made by disinterested and 
informed directors have an uphill battle in Delaware.”).  
80  There are the occasional rulings that seem to acknowledge the problem of 
executive compensation. See Thomas & Wells, supra note 25, at 879-80. See, e.g., In re 
Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del.Ch. 2009) (ruling that 
the plaintiff’s claim for waste in the grant of Citigroup’s former CEO could not be 
dismissed at the pleading stage). However, these cases work within the traditional 
framework of corporate waste, which is an exceedingly difficult standard to meet. 
Irrationality is “the outer limit of the business judgment rule” and “the functional 
equivalent of the waste test.” Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000). Waste occurs 
“only in the rare, ‘unconscionable case”’ where a board irrationally squanders corporate 
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current limits of state corporation law, the contours of which are shaped 
by corporation law’s unique aspects of the politics of revenue-generative 
lawmaking business, the legitimacy of longstanding doctrinal foundation, 
and judicial weighing when stare decisis confronts new social problems.  
 
C.  Say-On-Pay and the Dodd-Frank Act   
 
Regulation of compensation must be prescribed by legislation. This 
practical understanding gave rise to the say-on-pay phenomenon. Say-on-
pay is a fairly new concept.81 The idea originated in the U.K. where say-
on-pay was enacted in 2002.82 Other countries with advanced economies 
soon followed. Australia and the Netherlands enacted laws in 2004, 
Sweden in 2006, and Norway in 2007.83 The rapid adoption of say-on-pay 
in other advanced economies indicates a global perception of a problem in 
executive compensation.  
In the U.S., nascent efforts to influence the board’s discretion in 
compensation came in the form of shareholder proxy proposals. The first 
shareholder say-on-pay proxy proposals were submitted under Rule 14a-8 
in 2006.84  By 2009, say-on-pay proposals were the largest category of 
shareholder proxy proposals and regularly achieved majority shareholder 
support.85  A handful of companies even voluntarily instituted say-on-
pay.86 But these efforts were sporadic, depending on shareholder initiative 
in proxy proposals.  
Say-on-pay first became a federal regulatory requirement in 2008 and 
2009, when financial firms receiving TARP funds were required to 
institute shareholder say-on-pay.87 During this time, another high profile 
executive compensation episode captured the public’s attention. While the 
                                                                                                                                     
assets. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006). As such, the 
exception has been described as “theoretical.” Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 
1049, 1051-52 (Del. Ch. 1996).  
81  For a history, see Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1217-36. 
82  Id. at 1226.  
83  Id. at 1227. See generally Jan Lieder & Philipp Fischer, The Say-on-Pay Movement—
Evidence from a Comparative Perspective, 8 EUROPEAN COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 376 (2011) 
(discussing say-on-pay in Europe).  
84  Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1217.  
85  Id. at 1217-18.  
86  Id. at 1218.  
87  Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5221(e); American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 111(e), 123 Stat. 115, 519. 
About 280 financial firms that received TARP funds were required to hold say-on-pay 
votes. Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1223. 
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financial markets were collapsing and the American public was suffering 
through the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression,88 Wall 
Street investment bankers and executives received enormous “retention” 
bonuses.89 The decoupling of pay and performance on Wall Street was 
absolute and complete in this case. Since state laws were insufficient to 
address these kinds of problems, the federal government intervened in 
this area of corporate governance.90  
With the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the mandate of say-on-
pay was extended broadly to all U.S. public companies. 91  The statute 
requires that at least every 3 years, the company must allow a shareholder 
vote to approve executive compensation packages. 92  It also mandates 
votes on the frequency of the vote (whether taken every 1, 2 or 3 years) 
and golden parachute payments in a merger or acquisition.93 In spite of 
management recommendations for triennial votes, shareholders of most 
companies have voted to hold say-on-pay votes annually.94 Shareholder 
vote applies to the compensation packages of the top five executive 
officers named in the proxy compensation disclosure. 95  The vote is a 
straight “for” or “against” the overall compensation package and does not 
provide for line item voting on various aspects of the compensation 
package.96 The vote is advisory and not binding on the board.97 Say-on-
pay does not create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of the 
board or create any additional fiduciary duties.98 The authority to approve 
compensation packages rests squarely with the board.  
                                                                                                                                     
88  See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: 
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011).  
89  See Andrews & Baker, supra note 32.   
90  See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) (arguing that 
federal government intervenes in corporate governance when it perceives failures or 
inadequacies in state corporation laws). See also Mark J. Roe, A Spatial Representation of 
Delaware-Washington Interaction in Corporate Lawmaking, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 553 
(2012).  
91  Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1218. 
92  Dodd-Frank Act § 951 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1)). The disclosure of 
executive compensation is provided in 17 C.F.R. § 229.402. 
93  Dodd-Frank Act § 951 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(2), (b)). 
94  Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1249.  
95  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21(a) . 
96  Id.  
97  Dodd-Frank Act § 951 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(c)).  
98  Id.  
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The Dodd-Frank Act also strengthened the board’s independence on 
compensation decisions. Public companies must have independent board 
members on its compensation committee. 99  Relevant factors in 
determining independence are the source of compensation of a director, 
and whether a director is affiliated with the issuer or its affiliates.100  
The Dodd-Frank Act also recognizes the political and socio-economic 
dimensions of relative pay and income inequality. It requires disclosure of 
the median of the annual total compensation of all employees (not 
including the CEO), the annual total compensation of the CEO, and the 
ratio of the two figures. 101  Since CEO pay is already required to be 
disclosed, the important disclosure is the median employee pay. The ratio 
succinctly communicates pay differential. 102  The disclosure would be 
required in any annual report, proxy or information statement, or 
registration statement that requires executive compensation disclosure.103 
The wage ratio disclosure is not a direct benefit to shareholders, who are 
not so concerned with the relative pay levels. It is a legislative nod to the 
concerns of employees and the public.  
Several salutary benefits of the pay ratio disclosure may be achieved. 
Shaming may temper the most pecuniary appetites, though there is the 
distinct possibility that millions of more dollars may ultimately outweigh 
the cost of these negative feelings. Public disclosure and pressure may also 
be felt. Although CEOs are public figures, many would prefer to avoid 
notoriety in the eyes of the public. An eye-catching disparity in pay may 
depress employee morale and elicit disapproval, which are relevant to the 
production function. These combined effects may influence pay practices 
at the outer margins. The pay ratio disclosure is a small step toward 
greater equity in compensation.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
99  See supra note 70.   
100  Dodd-Frank Act § 952. New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manuel § 
303A.02(a)(ii) (providing the test of independence as “all factors specifically relevant to 
determining whether a director has a relationship to the listed company which is material 
to that director's ability to be independent from management in connection with the 
duties of a compensation committee member”).  
101  Dodd-Frank Act § 953(b) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78l).  
102  Thus, for example, if the CEO is paid $15 million and the medium employee 
income is $50,000, the required disclosure of the ratio would be 300:1. 
103  The SEC recently issued proposed rules on implementing Section 953(b). Pay 
Ratio Disclosure, Proposed Rule, Release Nos. 33-9452, File No. S7-07-13, 17 C.F.R. Parts 
229 and 249.  
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D.  Voting Results and Limits of Shareholder Monitoring   
 
Since shareholder say-on-pay is fairly new in the U.S., only 
preliminary data are available on outcomes and their effects. Two 
informative empirical studies of the first year of Dodd-Frank’s mandate 
have been conducted.104 The results show that shareholder say-on-pay 
may be a limited monitoring device.  
Shareholders strongly supported management resolutions on pay.105 
Votes in favor averaged 91.2% for all companies.106 Only 37 companies 
failed to receive majority support.107 These negative votes stemmed from 
shareholder discontent arising from a perceived disconnect between pay 
and company performance. 108  Overall, shareholder votes were highly 
correlated with share price returns and the amount of CEO pay. 109 
Unremarkably, shareholders favored high share returns and low CEO pay, 
and disliked low share returns and high pay. 110  Shareholders did not 
necessarily follow the recommendations of Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS), a proxy advisory firm. 111  While all 37 negative votes 
followed the negative recommendations of ISS, the firm recommended 
negative votes for 285 companies, 13% of the companies it reviewed.112  
                                                                                                                                     
104  See Thomas et al. (2013), supra note 11; Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11.  
105  In the 2011 proxy season, about 2,220 U.S. public companies held shareholder 
votes on executive compensation. Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1248.  
106  Id. at 1249. Thomas et al. report similar results from other empirical studies. See 
Michael Littenberg, Farzad Damania & Justin Neidig, A Closer Look at Negative Say-on-Pay 
Votes During the 2011 Proxy Season, DIRECTOR NOTES (Conference Bd.), July 2011, at 2 
(noting that only 36 companies, or 1.6%, of 2,225 companies in the Russell 3000 that held 
votes rejected management compensation resolutions). About 71% of companies received 
more than 90% shareholder vote, 23% received 70-90% vote, and 6% received 50-70% vote. 
Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1250. 
107  Id. at 1251.  
108  Id.  
109  Id. at 1249.  
110  Id.  
111  See http://www.issgovernance.com/. It provides proxy services to shareholders 
for a fee, and provides proxy voting recommendations.  
112  Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1255. However, ISS still had some 
influence. In another study, Thomas, Palmiter and Cotter report that when ISS 
recommended “for” votes, shareholders voted in favor on average 92.6% with no 
proposals being voted down. When ISS recommended “against” votes, shareholders 
voted in favor 64.4%, with 31 failed votes out of 173 “against” recommendations. Thomas 
et al. (2013), supra note 11, at 983.  
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In light of the mostly positive votes, “the voting gesture mandated by 
law might have been mostly empty.”113 However, the legal right to a voice 
on the issue may have changed the dynamics of the dialogue between 
shareholders and management.114 In a few cases, management has been 
responsive to some aspects of shareholder concern. 115  These marginal 
effects of shareholder voting and generally the limit of shareholder 
efficacy in monitoring are not surprising. Commentators have previously 
predicted that say-on-pay will be ineffective because shareholders will not 
engage in individualized analysis and monitoring of executive 
compensation.116 Preliminary data seem to support, in the main, these 
earlier critiques.  
The problem with shareholder say-on-pay is the well-recognized 
observation of rational shareholder apathy.117 “Often the aggregate cost to 
shareholders of informing themselves of potential corporate actions, 
independently assessing the wisdom of such actions, and casting their 
votes will greatly exceed the expected or actual benefits garnered from 
informed voting.”118 Apathy toward monitoring is rational from a cost-
benefit perspective. The problem is one of collective action. 119  It is 
exacerbated when diffused shareholders hold diversified portfolios of 
many investments,120 and when the turnover on the typical investment is 
relatively short even for longterm shareholders. 121  The profile of the 
                                                                                                                                     
113  Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1265.  
114  Id. See Thomas et al. (2013), supra note 11, at 1002-10 (providing four case studies 
of the dialogue between shareholders and management resulting from shareholder votes 
on executive compensation). 
115  See Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1265; Thomas et al. (2013), supra note 11, 
at 1002-10. Some empirical studies have suggested that say-on-pay has not changed the 
amount of compensation, but instead it changed the mix of cash and incentive pay. See 
Natasha Burns & Kristina Minnick, Does Say-on-Pay Matter? Evidence from Say-on-Pay 
Proposals in the United States, 48 FIN. REV. 233 (2013).  
116  See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the 
Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 341 (2009) (noting that in the U.K. 
shareholders approved compensation packages in many thousands of votes with only 
eight negative votes over a six-year period).  
117  See CLARK, supra note 12, at 390-400 (discussing the problem of the rationally 
apathetic shareholder).  
118  Id. at 390-91.  
119  Id. at 391-92.  
120  See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952).  
121  See Mark Roe, Are Stock Markets Really Becoming Really Becoming More Short Term?, 
PROJECT SYNDICATE (Feb. 21, 2013) (suggesting that the average hold period for longterm 
investors like Fidelity and Vanguard was 1.5 years in 2010; citing Martijn Cremers, Ankur 
Pareek, and Zacharius Saunter, Stock Duration and Misvaluation, 
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shareholder with most incentive to monitor and to engage actively in 
corporate governance is a longterm, activist, or undiversified shareholder, 
and while such shareholders exist they are not ubiquitous in a modern, 
liquid equity market in which diversification is said to be a good thing.122 
Lastly, as the efficient market hypothesis suggests, many shareholders 
rely on market prices to incorporate all public information, which further 
diminishes the incentive to monitor investments at the individual holding 
level.123  
Evidence in the voting patterns in the U.K. and the U.S. support this 
conventional view of shareholder apathy.124 Most shareholders most of 
the time vote in favor of management’s compensation. For a company that 
has not disappointed shareholders with lower returns or incited their 
discontent with excessively high executive compensation for poor 
performance, 125  the default vote would likely be in favor of the 
compensation package. Even when a proxy advisory firm issues a 
negative recommendation, shareholders mostly disregard the advice.126  
A contrary interpretation of the preliminary data could be that 
shareholders are fully engaged in monitoring compensation, and in the 
vast majority of cases they voted in favor of compensation packages after 
informed consideration. But advancing these conclusions would be 
difficult. Empirical data on voting outcomes do not reveal the thought 
processes of the many thousands of voting shareholders. One wonders 
whether shareholders examined the record and made individualized 
                                                                                                                                     
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2190437), available at 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/has-short-termism-in-stock-markets-
increased-by-mark-roe.  
122  See Markowitz, supra note 120, at 77 (showing that diversification was a 
normatively good investment strategy).  
123  See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 327 (11th ed. 2014) (“The evidence of efficient markets has 
convinced many professional and individual investors to give up pursuit of superior 
performance. They simply ‘buy the index,’ which maximizes diversification and cuts 
costs to the bone.”). See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Halliburton Co. v. 
Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2398 (2014).  
124  See KYM MAREE SHEEHAN, THE REGULATION OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: GREED, 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SAY ON PAY 145-59 (2012) (discussing the limited of institutional 
investors as effective monitors of executive pay).  
125  See Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1249 (reporting that “low returns and 
high CEO pay result[ed] in lower say-on-pay support”).  
126  See id. at 1265 (“ISS may be less influential than commonly thought on this type 
of proposal.”).  
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informed decisions for companies in their diversified portfolios.127 Also, 
shareholders are limited to market information, primarily share price 
returns and publicly disclosed financial results, explaining the 
relationship between the level of voting support and share price. The 
problem with shareholder monitoring is well founded.128 
The conclusion inferred from mostly positive votes is important. A 
hypothesis of informed decisionmaking would be far reaching. Since 
compensation levels have not come down due to say-on-pay, the 
implications would be that there has not been a real problem of executive 
compensation at all, and that informed shareholders agree with most pay 
packages. The many critiques are simply much ado about nothing since 
they do not reflect the concerns of most shareholders. However, this 
contrary interpretation of data has not been demonstrated to be true, and 
scholars have not advanced it.  
The problem of the rationally apathetic shareholder is significant in 
shareholder say-on-pay. Even institutional shareholders are not immune 
because as highly diversified, active traders in a liquid equity market, the 
cost-benefit analysis is acute. Although proxy advisers could ameliorate 
the collective action problem, 129  the preliminary empirical evidence 
suggests that this is not the case.130 If say-on-pay is limited in its efficacy, it 
reflects the fact that shareholders are limited in their capability to 
effectively monitor. Another monitor can be more effective or can 
complement the efforts of shareholders if the cost of monitoring is low 
and the incentive to monitor is higher.   
 
II.  EMPLOYEE SAY-ON-PAY 
 
A.  The Proposal   
 
                                                                                                                                     
127  See Michael Kang, Shareholder Voting as Veto, 88 IND. L.J. 1299, 1313 (2013) (“At 
least for such public companies with dispersed ownership, it is highly unlikely that the 
multiplicity of shareholders will remain well informed about the company's affairs and 
then achieve collective agreement on the best course of action for their company.”). 
128  See Adams, supra note 12, at 422 (noting that “shareholders have historically been 
of little importance in monitoring corporate conduct” due to “the collective action 
problem”). 
129  See Gordon, supra note 116, at 351-52.  
130  See Thomas et al. (2012), supra note 11, at 1213 (noting that “the net effect of a 
negative ISS recommendation on the overall shareholder vote is relatively small at most 
companies”).  
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This Article proposes the adoption of employee say-on-pay, which 
would mirror the Dodd-Frank Act’s mandate of shareholder say-on-pay. 
At least once every 3 years, a public U.S. corporation should hold an 
employee vote to approve the compensation of top executives.131 Unison 
of voting between shareholders and employees is not required, as long as 
employees have periodic opportunities to vote and convey information to 
the board. However, it would be ideal if shareholder and employee vote 
in tandem. Most shareholder votes occur annually, and so employee votes 
should be the same.  
Shareholder say-on-pay would be an advisory vote and not binding 
on the board.132 The Dodd-Frank Act mandates that the shareholder vote 
cannot be construed: “(1) as overruling a decision by such issuer or board 
of directors; (2) to create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of 
such issuer or board of directors; (3) to create or imply any additional 
fiduciary duties for such issuer or board of directors.” 133  These 
requirements should also apply to employee say-on-pay. The board has 
the ultimate authority to set compensation.  
Unlike shareholder say-on-pay, employee vote could be conditioned 
on a wage ratio trigger. The Dodd-Frank Act requires the disclosure of the 
wage ratio between the CEO and employees.134  Employee say-on-pay 
could be structured to trigger upon exceeding a certain level of wage ratio. 
There is an efficiency consideration. Say-on-pay is designed to police 
excessive compensation. A certain level of wage ratio could be deemed to 
be presumptively not excessive when compared to the baseline of the 
median employee pay, and thus employee say-on-pay could be structured 
to trigger at a certain level. For example, if the compensation ratio is 
20:1—a quaint level in light of the modern trend in compensation—one 
would question whether a say-on-pay vote by either shareholders or 
employees is really necessary.  
Certain intuitions can guide us. A trigger of 20:1 would most likely 
be deemed too low, and would take executive compensation back to the 
1960s and 1970s.135 A trigger of 100:1 would probably be too high because 
                                                                                                                                     
131  Cf. Dodd-Frank Act § 951.  
132  Id.  
133  Id.  
134
  Id. The SEC has announced proposed rules on wage ratio disclosure. Pay Ratio 
Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. Parts 229 and 249 (Release Nos. 33-9452; 34-70443; File No. S7-07-13).  
135  To be clear, the suggestion that it is “too low” refers to the necessary political 
compromises that have to take place to enact legislation. By way of comparison, the 
Japanese ratio of CEO to average employee pay is approximately 16:1. Jason Clenfield, In 
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this level is in the neighborhood of current levels that have caused public 
and political rebuke.136 Some compromise in the range between 50:1 to 
100:1 seems about right. This range permits high salary, but one suspects 
that neither employees nor the public would be so outraged by this sort of 
level. Any rent extraction that may occur would be fairly marginal, and 
properly deemed insignificant in light of the cost of monitoring.137  
A concrete example illustrated the point. Suppose the median 
employee pay at a corporation is $50,000.138 At a trigger range of 75:1, 
CEO pay could be $3.75 million without triggering employee say-on-pay. 
Based on current pay levels of CEOs today, the majority of public 
companies, most of which are by definition small cap and midcap 
companies, may not be required to hold employee votes.139 Since the size 
of CEO pay is highly correlated to the size of the corporation,140  the 
compensation packages for the largest companies would surely be subject 
to employee say-on-pay.141  
Parenthetically, the idea of a wage trigger can be applied as to the 
mandate of shareholder say-on-pay as a tweak of the Dodd-Frank reform. 
Such votes would be unnecessary if the wage ratio between the CEO and 
employees does not exceed a certain level. This reform of say-on-pay 
could have efficiency benefits. One strongly suspects that in light of the 
correlation between firm size and pay, a significant portion of smaller 
                                                                                                                                     
Japan, Underpaid—and Loving It, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_28/b4186014341924.htm.  
136  See supra note 29 and accompanying table. 
137  See Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, CEO Compensation, at 24 (“Moreover, 
‘awarding’ pay by allowing managers to extract some rents can be optimal if monitoring 
is costly.”), working paper available at 
http://web.mit.edu/frydman/www/COMP%20SURVEY%2008-02-10.pdf.  
138  See id. (providing average nonsupervisory worker compensation). Some 
companies pay their employees high compensation. See, e.g., Brett Philbin, Average 
Goldman Pay: $399,506, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2013) (noting the average pay at Goldman 
Sachs in 2012); Gus Lubin, Google Has the Highest Average Salaries in the Tech Industry: 
$141,000, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 10, 2011) (noting the average pay at Google in 2010).  
139  In 2012, the median total realized compensation of CEOs in the Russell 2000 was 
$1.8 million. Greg Ruel, CEO Pay Survey: Stock Option Profits Continue to Pave CEOs’ Path 
to the Bank,  GMI RATINGS  at 5 (2013) (based on a sample size of 1349 companies).  
140  See id at 4 (showing significant pay differences among CEOs in the S&P 
Smallcaps, Midcaps, and 500 indices, with 2012 median total realized compensations of 
$2.4 million, $4.9 million, and $11.9 million, respectively).  
141  See id. at 4 (showing that median total realized compensation of $11.9 million in 
2012 for CEOs of the Fortune 500 companies); Gretchen Morgenson, The Unstoppable 
Climb in C.E.O. Pay, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2013) (noting that the top 100 CEOs were paid a 
median compensation of $14 million in 2012).  
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companies,142 perhaps even a majority, would be exempt from holding 
say-on-pay votes with a reasonable trigger, and that a great majority of 
larger companies would still be subject to shareholder vote. One hastens 
to add that if the idea is appealing in the abstract, the difficulty in practice 
would be to identify the trigger level. A trigger in the range between 50:1 
to 100:1 seems plausible as a political compromise.  
 
B.  Weighed Voting    
 
Implementing a voting scheme requires careful weighing of fairness 
and efficiency considerations. Notwithstanding the rhetoric of shareholder 
democracy,143 a corporation is not a platonic political entity.144 It is an 
economic organization. In corporate governance, there is no liberty 
interest in the right to governance. The political principles of universal 
suffrage and “one person, one vote”145 do not apply for obvious reasons. 
Shareholders voting is based on shares held,146 and shareholder classes of 
                                                                                                                                     
142  The SEC provided an exemption from say-on-pay to smaller companies with less 
than $75 million in public float until January 20, 2013. Shareholder Approval of Executive 
Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, 76 Fed. Reg. 6010, 6010 (Feb. 2, 2011). 
Smaller reporting companies must now hold say-on-pay votes.  
143  Shareholder democracy is frequently used as short-hand for shareholder 
participation through voting in corporate governance. See Hoschett v. TSI Intern. 
Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43, 45-46 (Del.Ch. 1996) (Allen, Ch.) (noting that voting and 
deliberation aspects of shareholders’ annual meeting resembles democratic discourse); 
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del.Sup. 1971) (referring to the 
principle of shareholder voting as “corporate democracy”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The 
Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 842-43 (2005) (suggesting that 
shareholder democracy will enhance shareholder value). See also Lisa M. Fairfax, Making 
the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 55 (2008) (suggesting a 
link between shareholder democracy and corporate and executive accountability).  
144  See Hoschett v. TSI Intern. Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43, 45-46 (Del.Ch. 1996) (Allen, 
Ch.) (noting that “the model of democratic forms should not too strictly be applied to the 
economic institution of a business corporation (where for instance votes are weighted by 
the size of the voter's investment)”). See also Tom C.W. Lin, 47 UC DAVID L. REV. 1351, 
1399 (2014) (suggesting that “[c]orporations are not democratic nation-states” and that 
wholesale attempts to “democratize” them can cause serious harms).  
145  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  
146  See CLARK, supra note 12, at 390 (“We could argue further that voting rights 
should be proportional to one’s share of the residual interest in the firm.”). More 
generally, inequality and inequity are separate concepts in corporation law. See 
Applebaum v. Avaya, Inc., 812 A.2d 880, 886 (Del. 2002) (noting that “equity and equality 
are not synonymous concepts in the Delaware General Corporation Law”); Nixon v. 
Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) (“It is well established in our jurisprudence 
that stockholders need not always be treated equally for all purposes.”). 
                                                                                                                                               30-58 
unequal rights are permissible.147  Voting rights in corporations serve an 
economic purpose. 148  Unlike shareholders, employees and creditors 
typically do not vote on important matters such as director and 
fundamental transactions. 149  These observations raise a fundamental 
question of how the voting scheme should be conceived.  
Voting in corporations is not based on egalitarian principles. This 
Article proposes that every employee should have a vote, but that vote 
allocation should be unequal. Vote allocation should be a function of the 
potential effectiveness of different classes of employees as monitors of 
executive performance.  
Even the lowest ranking employee of a large public company may 
have some sense of how the company is doing. But their understanding of 
CEO performance would not compare to the senior manager of a business 
unit. Consider a low level worker at a large corporation with a market 
capitalization of $10 billion. How will the lowest rank and file employee, 
who may earn $25,000 per year, feel about the CEO earning $10 million, a 
ratio of 400:1? Would a visceral emotional reaction to the income disparity 
be relevant? These kinds of anticipated personal reactions at the firm level 
should not be factors in determining executive compensation.  
Employee say-on-pay must principally serve a monitoring role.150 
This function requires informed voting, which communicates relevant 
information to the board. Weighed voting is required. The allocation of 
voting rights should be based on employee titles, functions and job 
descriptions. In rational corporate hierarchies, the quantum and quality of 
information held is fairly correlated to position in the corporate hierarchy.  
Companies should have discretion to allocate votes, subject to a 
prohibition against gaming. Gaming can be achieved by allocating most 
voting power to the highest level of executive management since this layer 
would most favor executive pay proposals. There is a balance between 
calibrated voting and gamed outcomes. This balance can be achieved 
either through some qualitative standards, or through bright-line 
                                                                                                                                     
147  See DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 151(a) (permitting different preference rights and classes 
of stock). Companies like Google, Berkshire Hathaway, Alibaba, and Ford Motor have 
different classes of common stock with different voting rights.  
148  See FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW (1996) (explaining the importance of voting rights of equity capital).  
149  Cf. DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 221 (permitting debt instruments to have voting rights). 
Absent unusual circumstances, however, it would be odd for debt instruments to have 
voting rights. Eliasen v. Itel Corp., 82 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.).  
150  See Adams, supra note 12, at 442 (noting that full-circle evaluations promote 
“efficiency and profitability”).  
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quantitative rules.151 For example, a proportion that allocates 20% of the 
vote to the non-managerial rank and file workforce might not be an 
unreasonable mix. This allotment is a significant but nevertheless minority 
voting power. The visceral reaction of the average employee against a 
relatively high CEO pay, if that is the fear, would not overwhelm the 
voting outcome. At the same time, knowing what average employees 
think about their CEO’s pay is still relevant information for the board. 
Issues like morale, happiness, job satisfaction, commitment to the firm, 
social cohesion, and sense of common undertaking (if not common lot); 
and they are relevant factors in the corporation’s production function. A 
small but meaningful allocation serves an information function. Each 
company should be allowed to calibrate voting such that there can be 
meaningful participation.  
The class of voters with the greatest individual voting power should 
be the managerial ranks below the highest executive level subject to SEC 
compensation reporting requirements. This is a significant class of senior 
executives who are managers of large business units or functions. They 
possess the best information on the performance of the CEO and the 
company’s prospects, but they are most likely to be biased in favor of the 
CEO. These competing tensions balance such that they have the greatest 
individual voting power, but not class voting power. Class voting power is 
limited by the pyramidal organizational structure where more senior 
ranks are smaller in number.  
There are compelling reasons to argue that the class of voters with 
the greatest voice should be the senior and middle managers, the layers 
below the highest executive ranks. 152  This group is large in most 
businesses. They connect the shop floor with the executive suite. They 
have management responsibilities, tasked with executing the strategies 
given down from above. They have broad organizational awareness, and 
a good sense of connecting corporate strategy with tactical understanding. 
They dream of climbing higher the corporate hierarchy, high enough to 
earn the keys to the executive suites; yet they are not so far removed from 
the bottom tier to have lost a sense of economic proportion. They report 
directly to senior executives, and the managerial rank exchanges vital 
                                                                                                                                     
151  See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 557 (1992) (analyzing the difference between rules and standards and their best 
application).   
152  “Midlevel management knows how well the company is functioning on a daily 
basis and which parts of the company’s structure needs additional work.” Adams, supra 
note 12, at 432.  
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information. They are in routine contact with outside constituencies such 
as suppliers and customers. They are important inputs for gauging morale, 
and influence broader rank and file morale.  
Middle and seniors managers collectively know much about the state 
of the corporation, its trajectory, and the cause and effect of corporate 
leadership, and in many cases they collectively know more than their 
individual superiors. They are the leaders in the trenches of the firm, and 
their collective opinions should not be underestimated even at the rarified 
board level, though as a practical matter it is difficult for boards to get 
direct information in this regard.   
While the rank and file worker who earns $25,000 may not be an 
informed voter in some respect, the same may not be said for the $250,000 
non-executive vice president responsible for a market segment or a 
product. Such a person would have significant information on the state of 
the company, how the senior executives are managing the company, and 
ultimately the performance of the CEO. Furthermore, the class of vice 
presidents on the same level would hold a substantial quantum and 
quality of the firm’s total information.  
Based on the foregoing reasons, a stylized example of a voting 
allocation might look something like this: 20% the general workforce, 60% 
middle and senior managers, and 20% senior officers. In this scheme, fully 
80% of the voting power is allocated to the managerial ranks, though the 
managerial rank is not the same as the rank of senior executives whose 
compensation are subject to the board’s decision. I note that there is no 
“correct” proportion, but a range of reasonable voting allocations.  
 
C.  Gamed Voting     
 
Whenever there is consequential voting, there lurks a potential 
problem of gaming. There are two kinds of gaming problems here. The 
first is where the allocation of votes can stack the deck in favor of the CEO. 
This is structural gaming in which the structure of the scheme determines 
the outcome. The second is internal gaming in which the vote is affected 
by the employee’s internal motivations apart from incentive to monitor. 
These gaming effects are related.  
Confidentiality in voting is important since retaliation can be a real 
risk, particularly at the senior ranks.153 An employee may be rationally 
fearful if confidentiality cannot be assured. Rank and file employees 
                                                                                                                                     
153  See id. at 431, 437 (stressing the importance of anonymity in full-circle evaluations 
where subordinates are evaluating supervisors).  
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would have less to fear. Would a CEO fire some random assembly line 
worker in a far-flung operation due to a negative vote? Such fear would 
be more grounded in reality among the senior and managerial ranks, and 
these ranks are important to elicit information.  
Confidentiality can be breached through deductive analysis of voting 
outcomes if voting allocation is structurally gamed. While it would be 
impossible for anyone to know how a specific low level employee voted 
based on voting results, deductive analysis can reveal the votes or voting 
patterns of employees with significant voting power.  
A simple example illustrates the point. Suppose there are four classes 
of employees below the top executives whose compensations are subject 
to board approval and public disclosure. The corporate hierarchy has four 
levels: class A is the senior executives, class B senior non-executive 
managers, class C middle managers, and class D the general workforce. 
The class voting allocations are: 20% (A), 28% (B), 30% (C), and 22% (D). 




Suppose the compensation package was voted down, receiving 30 
“against” votes, which is 60% of the total votes. It is impossible to know 
how the lower level employees voted, and from the CEO’s perspective she 
may not care as much. The CEO works most closely with the executives 
and senior managers—the three employees in classes A and B. Since these 
three hold 24 votes, it is a mathematical certainty that at least one of them 
voted “against.” Also, it is unlikely that only one voted “against.” If the 
class A employee voted “against” (10 votes), then the remaining 20 
“against” votes must have come from the collective 26 votes held at 
classes C and D, which is perhaps an unlikely 77% majority of the lower 
two classes. If the one negative vote was from a class B employee (7 votes), 
then the remaining 23 “against” votes must have come from the 26 votes 
at classes C and D, which is a highly unlikely 88% majority of the lower 
two classes. These outcomes are plausible, but in varying degrees unlikely. 
A CEO can be confident that the most like possibility is that two of the 













A 1 10 20% 10 20%
B 2 7 14% 14 28%
C 5 3 6% 15 30%
D 11 1 2% 11 22%
Total 19 na na 50 100%
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to her—voted “against.” If the CEO had other information as well, for 
example, past dealings, personal interactions, and emotional intuitions, 
the identities of the “against” voters could be fairly obvious. By voting 
“against”, these employees would not have enhanced their career 
prospects. A CEO who correctly perceives that a majority of her 
management team does not have confidence in her can solve the problem 
by replacing the team. Thus, under this voting structure, higher class 
employees would have incentive to internally game the vote irrespective 
of her opinions on the company’s prospects and the CEO’s performance.  
Such deductive reasoning quickly loses efficacy when the voting 
permutations increase due to greater number of voters and decreased 
concentration of voting powers. As the saying goes, there is safety in 
numbers. Consider a more complex organization with the identical voting 
allocations by employee rank. The class voting allocations are exactly the 
same above: 20% (A), 28% (B), 30% (C), and 22% (D). But there are now 





Suppose again that there are 60% “against” votes constituting 60 
votes. It is not clear what combination of voters produced the 60% 
outcome. Some combination of six employees at classes A and B must 
have voted no, but it is unclear who they may be. Again, intuitions and 
insights from personal dealings may shed some light, but the conclusions 
may be far less reliable. Much of the deductive reasoning power loses 
efficacy when votes become confidential due to the ability to hide in 
numbers.  
These simple examples can be generalized to the situations at 
corporations of various sizes. These examples show that gaming is less 
problematic at larger corporations than smaller ones due to the increased 
number of voters. Unless the allocation is clearly gamed at larger 
corporations, the problem of voting transparency is not so significant. 
However, giant multinational corporations exist at one end of the size 













A 2 10 10% 20 20%
B 4 7 7% 28 28%
C 6 5 5% 30 30%
D 22 1 1% 22 22%
Total 34 na na 100 100%
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companies where employees and managers may know each other broadly 
and intimately. In these cases, a concern for confidentiality would be real.  
These simple examples also show the relationship between gaming 
and confidentiality. Gaming can achieved through the structure of the 
scheme: i.e., giving the employees most likely to vote in favor the most 
number of votes, which for a CEO would be the highest executive level 
employees. Gaming can also be internally influenced: i.e., employees 
voting strategically for self-interested reasons, which affect the highest 
executive level employees the most. Absent discord at the highest ranks, 
we would expect that senior executives would be most inclined to support 
the CEO’s pay package, particularly since they would identify with the 
CEO as they aspire to that level as well. The highest ranking employees 
have the greatest incentive to monitor company performance and the best 
inside information, which are reasons why they should have the most 
votes. Yet too much concentration of voting may result in gaming. The 
best voting allocation would balance these considerations.  
 
D.  Implementation  
 
Despite the framework based on shareholder say-on-pay, several 
issues are unique to employee voting. The problems are conceptualizing 
the corporate hierarchy for the purpose of vote allocation, the right to vote 
for foreign employees, and the mechanics of voting.  
Corporations have organizational charts and are defined by a 
hierarchical system of titles, functions, responsibilities, and powers. 
Conceptualizing the organization is not a difficult problem. The systems 
of human resources departments are in place to organize a voting scheme. 
The asserted difficulty of the task is simply a reflection of the strength of 
the objection.  
Although a U.S. public company may have sprawling international 
operations, voting should be limited to U.S.-based employees. The 
practical reason is that wage standards across the globe vary radically.154 
In terms of monitoring capabilities and inside information, U.S.-based 
employees of U.S. firms would probably be better, generally speaking, 
                                                                                                                                     
154  For example, in 2011 the average Chinese worker earned approximately 42,000 
yuan per year, which is approximately $6,900 (at a conversion rate of 1 yuan to $0.16). 
Wages in China, China Labour Bulletin (June 10, 2013) (noting that the average worker 
made 3,500 yuan monthly in 2011), available at 
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/wages-china. This figure is significantly lower than 
the average U.S. worker pay. See supra note 29 & accompanying chart.  
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since they are likely to be more knowledgeable about the state of the 
company. For example, American employees of General Motors may be 
more knowledgeable about the company than their counterparts in China, 
and German employees of Volkswagen may have the same advantage 
over employees in Mexico. For U.S. companies, the information quality 
provided by U.S.-based employees would generally be better due to 
knowledge gained from closer physical, informational, and relational 
proximities.  
The most difficult implementation issue is the judgment that would 
go toward allocating votes. The board should have discretion to exercise 
business judgment, subject to regulatory guidelines against gaming, to 
allocate votes within the corporate hierarchy in a way that achieves 
informed voting. The regulation can be in the form of a report and 
proposal to the SEC, subject to agency consent, discussing the 
corporation’s organization, categorization of employees, vote allocation 
assignments per category, and the rationale for the particular assignments. 
As difficult as allocating votes may be, the exercise of judgment on 
difficult matters is what boards and executives are paid to do. 
Unlike shareholders voting which occurs through an existing proxy 
process, a company must create a new voting process to achieve employee 
say-on-pay. This raises the questions of cost. Under the standard theory, 
agency cost is defined as the sum of the contracting cost between principal 
and agent, monitoring cost by the principal, the bonding cost by the agent, 
and the residual loss.155  This theory suggests that some rent extraction by 
CEOs may be efficient (economically tolerable) if the monitoring costs of 
such behavior is greater than the rent extracted.156 
The cost of establishing voting, while significant, will not be high 
relative to the issue at stake. Organizational structure already exists, and 
the most difficult aspect of constructing a voting scheme is the exercise of 
judgment. Voting would not be a mandatory condition of employment, 
but like political voting a voluntary act of participation.  
Voting can be done electronically. Corporations can easily create a 
voting portal in which employees can login through a company-issued 
identification, such as a password or social security number, and vote on 
the package.157 Corporations can achieve amazing feats of organization, 
                                                                                                                                     
155  Jensen & Meckling, supra note 13, at 308; see MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE 
FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS (2000).  
156  See supra note 137.   
157  See Adams, supra note 12, at 432 (stating that full-circle evaluations can be 
administered through the internet “without much added cost”).  
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data collection, analysis, and use of information technology. 158  An 
objection that voting would be technologically infeasible or too costly as a 
direct expenditure would defy credibility based on everyday observations 
of the routine use of information technology by many parts of society 
including business corporations. 
In conclusion, the implementation of employee say-on-pay is quite 
feasibility. The real issue is whether employee say-on-pay would produce 
better corporate governance as to executive compensation, and whether 
these benefits are outweighed by the objections to the idea. These issues 
are discussed in the next two sections.  
 
III.  BENEFITS OF EMPLOYEE SAY   
 
A.  Advantage of Private Information     
 
The principal rationale for employee say-on-pay is that employees 
hold the corporation’s entire information content. The advantage of 
employees as monitors compared to shareholders is apparent when we 
consider the question of information through the lens of market efficiency. 
Economists have classified levels of market efficiency: strong, semi-strong, 
and weak forms of efficiency.159 The weak form is the hypothesis that past 
information such as stock prices has been incorporated into the current 
stock price, and it is certainly correct. 160  The semi-strong form is the 
hypothesis that stock price adjust immediately to all publicly available 
information. There is a question of whether the market is always semi-
strong efficient,161 but one can say without controversy that the market 
                                                                                                                                     
158  See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, What Does Your Credit-Card Company Know About You?, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2009) (discussing how credit card companies can predict individual 
consumer behavior through data collection and analysis).  
159  See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) (proposing that there are three types of market efficiency, 
which are strong, semi-strong, and weak forms of efficiency). See generally Ronald J. 
Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 
(1983) 
160  FRANK J. FABOZZI & FRANCO MODIGLIANI, CAPITAL MARKETS: INSTITUTIONS AND 
INSTRUMENTS 291 (4th ed. 2009). 
161  See id. (“Evidence on whether the stock market is price efficient in the semi-
strong form is mixed.”); WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 36 (7th ed. 2012) (“The number of EMH supporters in the financial economic 
community has dwindled.”); Robert J. Shiller, We'll Share the Honors, and Agree to Disagree, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2013) (“have argued that the theory makes little sense, except in fairly 
trivial ways. Of course, prices reflect available information. But they are far from 
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often rapidly incorporates publicly disclosed information such as press 
releases, disclosures, and annual reports. 162  The strong form is the 
hypothesis that market price of stock incorporates all public and private 
information, and this version of market efficiency is certainly not 
correct.163 With this broad outline of the efficient market hypothesis in 
mind, one must conclude that, even if shareholder voting is informed, it 
can only be based on publicly available information.  
On the other hand, employees have not only all of the information 
available to shareholders (many are themselves shareholders), but they 
also have private information. “Private information” is not a reference to 
legally prohibited information,164 but instead information relevant to the 
performance of the firm and its executives that are not readily accessible 
to the public. These kinds of information may include knowledge of 
specific matters of business operations and strategy, more generalized 
information on the sense of organizational “well-being,” and company 
morale, which is relevant as an indicator of past and present firm 
performance and expectation of future performance. Under specific 
                                                                                                                                     
perfect.”). The presumption of market efficiency is the basis for the fraud-on-the-market 
theory of Rule 10b-5 securities fraud actions. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 
(1988). There are nuances to market efficiency, such the degree and time responsiveness 
in which public information is absorbed, that are important in securities actions. See 
generally Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WISC. 
L. REV. 151; Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New 
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003); Baruch Lev & Meiriing de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 
10b–5 Damages: A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV 7, 20 (1994). These 
nuances are not relevant for the discussion here.  
162  See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2398, 2410 (2014) (“Even 
the foremost critics of the efficient-capital-markets hypothesis acknowledge that public 
information generally affects stock prices.”).  
163  “No one these days accepts the strongest version of the efficient capital market 
hypothesis, under which non-public information automatically affects prices. That 
version is empirically false: the public announcement of news (good and bad) has big 
effects on stock prices, which could not happen if prices already incorporated the effect of 
non-public information.” West v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 
2002) (Easterbrook, J.). See, e.g., Arthur J. Keown & John M. Pinkerton, Merger 
Announcements and Insider Trading Activity: An Empirical Investigation, 36 J. FIN. 855 (1981) 
(showing rapid rise of stock price to reflect merger announcements and acquisition 
premiums); Leslie A. Jeng, Andrew Metrick & Richard Zeckhauser, Estimating the Returns 
to Insider Trading: A Performance-Evaluation Perspective, 85 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 453 
(2003) (finding abnormal returns of more than 6% per year from insider purchase). 
Indeed, if the strong form of market efficiency was correct, there would be no need for 
insider trading laws since insiders would not be able to profit from private information.  
164  See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (involving 
misappropriation of confidential information under the securities laws).  
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information concerning or leading to inferences of these matters are 
publicly disclosed, they are private information held only by the collective 
employees. Under employee say-on-pay, private information would be 
reflected in the voting results.  
If one believes that there is a perfect correlation between information 
that is readily publicly available, such as public disclosures and press 
releases, and the private information held by employees (that is, the 
strong form of market efficiency), there would be no rationale for 
employee say-on-pay on efficiency grounds. However, no company is 
perfectly transparent, and private information always exists.  
Shareholder and employee say-on-pay would work at different levels 
of market efficiency. Shareholders are most likely to vote “no” when share 
prices are declining and as a result can be said to reflect the publicly 
available information. If employees have a vote, they would be most likely 
to vote “no” when the information they hold on the executive’s role in the 
corporation’s past performance and expectation of the future conflicts 
with the pay package. This would be private information flowing into the 
voting mechanism.  
 
B.  Reverse Monitoring    
 
Employee say-on-pay serves as reverse monitoring of executive 
performance and pay. Employees are said to have many roles, including 
citizens at work, stakeholders, human capital, and investors.165 Employees 
can also be monitors of executives. Reverse monitoring is the idea that 
employees are monitors of their peers including their supervisors, and not 
just the targets of monitoring by the company.166 Typically, we think of 
the evaluation and monitoring in the corporate hierarchy as a sequence of 
top-down processes emanating from the board to the senior officers, and 
progressively going down toward the base of the pyramid. But in reality 
monitoring can be multidirectional.  
The application of reverse monitoring is seen in different contexts. It 
has been suggested that, contrary to conventional wisdom that stock 
options impart ownership incentives on employees, employee stock 
options promote a reverse monitoring function, wherein employees are 
incentivized to monitor peer misconduct or shirking to avoid a decline in 
                                                                                                                                     
165  Arthurs & Mummé, supra note 21, at 352-67.  
166  Sharon Hannes, Reverse Monitoring: On the Hidden Role of Employee Stock-Based 
Compensation, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1423-24, 1446 (2007).  
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the value of their options.167 Also, whistleblower protections and qui tam 
actions are based on the idea that employees can monitor the corporation 
and their peers for wrongdoing on behalf of the corporation or the 
public.168 It is wise policy to give employees the incentives and the means 
to monitor organizational governance.169 
Reverse monitoring is not a radical concept. It is widely used in 
corporations. Many major public corporations routinely use “full-circle” 
or 360 evaluations where subordinates evaluate the performance of their 
supervisors.170 Such evaluations steadily gained acceptance in the 1980s 
and 1990s both as a decisionmaking tool and a method for evaluating 
management.171 Full-circle evaluations provide crucial information on the 
performance of senior managers by those they supervise. The only thing 
radical in the concept of employee say-on-pay is that the top corporate 
officer would be subject to firm-wide evaluation by all subordinates. But it 
is not clear why the CEO and senior executives, being an employee as well, 
should be inherently exempt from such evaluations. Voting would simply 
formalize opinions already held. It is true that boards evaluate senior 
executives, but they require information to do so.  
The idea that employees can serve as monitors of peers and superiors 
is based on the plain fact that they possess all of the information content of 
                                                                                                                                     
167  Id. at 1423-25. The idea is that individual employees can do more harm to the 
corporation than they can increase value. Stock options incentivize reverse monitor by 
employees whose options may be subject to destruction of value by other employees. Id.  
168  See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 922 (providing whistleblower protection); Sarbanes-
Oxley Act § 806 (same); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (providing for qui tam 
action for fraud against the U.S. government).  
169  See Hannes, supra note 166, at 1424 (“It is hard to imagine anyone in a better 
position to fulfill this [monitoring] mission [than employees], and because their duties do 
not include this task, it is wise to give them an incentives to do so . . . .”). See also Orly 
Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97 
CALIF. L. REV. 433 (2009) (discussing the role of employees in ensuring the legality and 
compliance obligations of organizations).  
170  See Adams, supra note 12, at 429-35. Companies like Walt Disney, General Motors, 
American Airlines, Intel, DuPont, IBM, and RCA have used full-circle evaluations. Id. at 
431, 433. According to one survey, 90% of Fortune 1000 companies surveyed had 
implemented some form of full-circle or multisource evaluation system. Id. at 433 (citing 
Mark R. Edwards & Ann JU. Ewen, How to Manage Performance and Pay with 360-Degree 
Feedback, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REV., May/June 1996, at 41). See H. John Bernardin & 
Richard W. Beatty, Can Subordinate Appraisals Enhance Managerial Productivity?, 28 SLOAN 
MANAGEMENT REV. 63 (1987) (arguing for giving employees “voice” in the performance 
evaluation of their supervisors).  
171  Adams, supra note 12, at 429.  
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the firm.172 Not even the CEO would possess this quantity of information, 
and certainly the board would not. Shareholders are incapable of 
observing everything a manager does and is limited to public information. 
But employees benefit from direct observation and private or difficult to 
acquire information. Their vote would express this information content. 
Since this inside information o is valuable,173  the rationale for reverse 
monitoring is compelling.  
When employees are monitoring peers or supervisors, monitoring is 
costless and requires only awareness.174 But one may question the quality 
of the information. In large corporations, direct observations cannot be 
made in some circumstances. Most CEOs would be incompetent to 
evaluate most employees in the company due to the fact that they would 
not have personal observations arising from direct professional dealings. 
As a factual corollary, most employees are not in day-to-day contact with 
the CEO and other senior executives. So does this mean that employees 
would be equally incompetent? No, the symmetry does not hold.  
Interpersonal dealings with the CEO do not define the directness of 
observation for the purpose of monitoring and evaluation. There is direct 
assessment in the sense that employees execute the decisions of the CEO 
and observe the influence of such decisions on the corporate performance 
and prospects. Information in a corporation is not like water, always 
flowing downwards; it is like air, ubiquitous in the complex networks of 
professional relationships and organizational processes. All employees 
have organizational awareness resulting from being a part of the firm’s 
complex information flow. Information is transmitted and received multi-
directionally in a complex organization. 175  The general sense of the 
collective employees is often accurate.176 One need not be a historian to 
                                                                                                                                     
172  “[I]nformation is always more complete and reliable within the firm than outside 
it.” PHAN, supra note 16, at 15.  
173  Existence of inside corporate information is the basis for the prohibition against 
insider trading. See id. at 15 (arguing that insider trading laws prohibit benefiting from 
inside information, which is superior to public information available to non-insider 
investors). 
174  Hannes, supra note 166, at 1424.  
175  See CHESTER I. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 104-11 (1938) 
(describing the networks of relationships and communication channels in a complex 
organization and showing the mathematical permutations of relationships within a firm).  
176  See generally JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WIDOM OF CROWDS (2005) (discussing how 
large groups of people accurately observe, assess, or solve better than a few individuals). 
Cf. Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy: The Convergence of Capital Markets, 
Insurance, and Government Action, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 435, 524 n.437 (discussing the ability of 
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understand that there have been countless instances in history in which 
leaders of organizations—be they military, corporations, civic, or 
governments—have lost the confidence of their subordinates for reasons 
that have proved to be well founded.  
It is doubtful that the board, as a collective group working part-time 
as board do, would know more about the performance of the CEO than 
the collective employees including the cadre of middle and senior 
managers, and the senior executive team. From the perspective of 
information, the problem for the board becomes greater as the corporation 
increases in size and complexity, and as the board increasingly relies on 
information provided by the CEO and the outside advisers hired by the 
senior executives. Since employees possess highly relevant information, 
full-circle evaluations can serve a reverse monitoring role in evaluating 
the compensation packages of senior executives.177   
Lastly, there is a special form of monitoring and assessment that may 
have particular usefulness in executive compensation. In some instances, 
executive compensation may be so patently excessive based on absolute 
amount178 or in relation to firm performance179  or the average worker 
pay.180 These cases may be subject to a collective sensibility, something 
like Justice Potter Stewart’s famous quip on pornography “I know it when 
I see it,”181 a visceral reaction to something obscene that may serve as a 
useful standard in extreme cases. Although even gross excessiveness of 
pay may prove to be too little to overcome shareholder inertia (at least 
sufficient to obtain a majority negative vote), monitoring by employees 
may be effective. Employee say-on-pay might be particularly useful in 
                                                                                                                                     
the futures markets to predict accurately on a probabilistic basis political and sporting 
outcomes).  
177  Cf. Adams, supra note 12, at 435, 437 (arguing that institutional investors use full-
circle evaluations from middle managers, among others, to evaluate the compensation 
packages of senior executives).  
178  See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006) 
(noting that corporate executive was paid approximately $130 million for 14 months of 
work). 
179  See, e.g., Annie Lowry, Pay Still High at Bailed-Out Companies, Report Says, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013) (reporting that executive compensation was high even for financial 
firms bailed out during the financial crisis).  
180  See, e.g., Elliot Blair Smith & Phil Kuntz, CEO Pay 1,795-to-1 Multiple of Wages 
Skirts U.S. Law, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2013) (reporting that the CEO of J.C. Penney’s was 
paid $53.3 million while the average employee was paid $29,688), available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-30/ceo-pay-1-795-to-1-multiple-of-workers-
skirts-law-as-sec-delays.html.  
181  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).  
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unusual or outlier cases in which there is no reasonable explanation for 
the size of the pay other than board capture and failure of proper 
contracting.  
 
C.  Information Asymmetry in Governance       
 
A well-known paradox of corporate governance is that the board is 
the ultimate managerial authority charged with “managing” the senior 
executives, 182  but the latter possesses far greater information. 183  The 
typical board meets 4 to 6 times a year for an average of 4 hours per 
meeting. 184  Information is the source of power and influence in the 
corporation. Practically, senior executives have significant power in the 
corporation and influence the board’s thinking and actions. The ultimate 
source of management power is the distinct information asymmetry 
between the board and the management.185 If the board had the same or 
superior information, it could always second-guess or countermand 
management opinions, recommendations, and decisions.   
Much of the corporation’s information is held below, synthesized, 
and then sent upwards in the corporate hierarchy in the reporting process. 
In most corporate hierarchies the board would not have much contact 
with employees at lower levels in the routine course of managing the 
business and affairs of the corporation. This is not a failing of boards per 
se. Consider a corporation that has 50,000 employees, 1,000 of whom are 
non-executive managers. Not only do board members have day jobs, but 
their numbers are woefully insufficient for operational management. 
Operational management is the job of the senior officers. The liability 
scheme in corporation law recognizes the reality that the board, albeit 
ultimate managers, cannot directly engage the largest segment of 
management.186  
                                                                                                                                     
182  DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b).  
183  PHAN, supra note 16, at 145. See ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 295 (5th ed. 2011) (“Directors can never know as much about the operation 
of the company as management, so they are dependent on the CEO for being supplied 
with accurate, timely, and material information.”).  
184  PHAN, supra note 16, at 37.  
185  Id. at 146.  
186  A failure of the duty to monitor is “possibly the most difficult theory in 
corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.” In re Caremark 
Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). In Delaware, the standard is 
“a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter 
failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system.” Id. at 971.  
                                                                                                                                               44-58 
We should not mistake infeasibility of operational management with 
irrelevance of information that could be gotten or undesirability of such 
oversight if such active management could hypothetically occur. Consider 
the agency problem of monitoring corporate executives through the lens 
of the Coase Theorem. In the context of legal entitlements, if transaction 
costs were zero, parties would rearrange their rights in a way that 
maximizes efficiency irrespective of the initial assignment of the rights.187 
But once transaction costs are considered, the rearrangement of rights 
only occurs if the increase in production exceeds the cost of bringing 
about this reordering.188 A lesson drawn is that the law should initially 
assign rights in a way that reflects the hypothetical bargain of the 
parties.189 Organizational law can be analyzed from this perspective as 
well.190  
One can analyze the agency cost problem of monitoring corporate 
executives through a Coasean prism. If monitoring costs were zero, the 
board would vigorously monitor and manage executives. This monitoring 
would entail acquiring and analyzing information held in the firm. The 
board would solicit information from employees, in the very same way 
that senior executives solicit information from subordinates. Since the real 
world has monitoring cost, such operational management is infeasible. 
However, if information conveyance can be cost effective, the board 
would benefit. One such device is employee say-on-pay. The point is 
fairly obvious: Would employees have something to add in a hypothetical 
board deliberation on the CEO’s performance if the interchange and 
monitoring costs were low?  
                                                                                                                                     
187  R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-7, 15 (1960). 
188  Id. at 15-16. Unless the initial arrangement of rights established by the legal 
system is efficient, “the costs of reaching the same result by altering and combining rights 
through the market may be so great that this optimal arrangement of rights, and the 
greater value of production which it would bring, may never be achieved.” Id. at 16.  
189  Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of Public 
Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 566 (2009). Courts have used the analytic heuristic of 
an ex ante hypothetical transaction to determine the most efficient rule of law. See, e.g., 
Stockberger v. United States, 332 F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (noting that 
“[h]ypothetical-contract analysis is a powerful tool for understanding tort law and 
determining its scope”); Bamford v. Turnley, (1862) 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 33 (Exch.), rev'g 
(1860) 122 Eng. Rep. 25 (Q.B.) (analyzing nuisance case from hypothetical decision of 
individual owner of properties in question).  
190  See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 37 (2010) ( “When filling 
gaps in the corporate contracts, courts cannot look to the actual intent of thousands of 
parties so they make up a hypothetical ‘intent’ based on what the courts view as 
reasonable.”).  
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Say-on-pay is a modest device that provides a more diverse mix of 
information to the board. An important aspect of say-on-pay is the 
quantum of information: a simple percentage signifying approval or 
disapproval. Shareholder say-on-pay provides direct, relevant input on 
the opinion of shareholders. This opinion is based on market and public 
information. Employee say-on-pay remedies the problem of information 
asymmetry between board and management by providing direct, relevant 
input on the opinion of employees.  
In the ideal world of zero monitoring costs, the board would gather 
information from both senior management and employees.191 Employee 
say-on-pay provides relevant information that is relatively costless. In this 
way, it helps to offset the informational power of management over the 
board, which can promote board capture and work against good 
corporate governance.  
 
D.  Fiduciary Ideals, Board Cover and Leverage     
 
Employee say-on-pay promotes fiduciary ideals. The “board capture” 
criticism asserts that corporate governance has broken down in the realm 
of executive compensation. The board is a fiduciary of the corporation. 
While the legal rules of corporate governance make it exceedingly difficult 
to impose remedies for the board’s breach of fiduciary duty, legal rules are 
distinct from fiduciary ideals.192 In a world of ontological truth, there can 
be no doubt that there are many instances in which fiduciary duties are 
not in fact kept. In any adjudication, the probable and the provable are not 
always the same.193 Adjudications in corporation law are not so special 
that they rise above the indisputable limitations of the adjudicatory 
process.194 In fact, corporation law is analogous to criminal law in the 
                                                                                                                                     
191  In some companies, the board has complete access to employees according to 
their corporate governance guidelines. For example, the board of Intel has complete 
access while the board of General Motors is restricted in its access by management. PHAN, 
supra note 16, at 172-73.  
192  Commentators have suggested that corporate law incorporates standards of 
conduct as opposed to legal rules of liability. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How 
Does Delaware Corporation Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997); Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993).  
193  See L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977).  
194  For example, the old chestnut, Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 
(1976), can be understood from the divide between the probable and the provable. “It can 
be explained by improper but unprovable motives such as a vain attempt to support 
short-term stock prices for the purpose of executive compensation, or obfuscating the 
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sense that legitimate and overriding policy considerations, as seen in the 
burdens of proof and presumptions respectively, produce numerous 
adjudicatory errors from the perspective of ontological truth.195  
In the realm of executive compensation, the fiduciary ideal is simple: 
the board should award compensation free of structural bias in favor of 
management, informed with all public and private information available, 
and based on performance. In this respect, employee say-on-pay promotes 
fiduciary ideals. It communicates relevant information in a manageable 
form at low cost. It is simply an added measure of informed 
decisionmaking, which is the hallmark of the fiduciary duty of care.196 
In corporate governance, there is a symbiotic relationship between 
the board and the management. Boards depend on management. A 
negative aspect of this co-dependency is structural bias. The problem is 
not difficult to fathom. CEOs have significant influence on board 
compensation and nominations. Insider board members, such as senior 
executives, are subject to the CEO’s authority in their roles as officers. The 
board is a social institution populated by an elite group of individuals 
who routinely interact with each other in their business, social, and 
political worlds.197 Although a genial and collegial working relationship 
between the board and the management is a good thing, it would also 
lead to structural bias.198  
A number of devices tend to offset structural bias and empower the 
board’s independence. Board members are subject to fiduciary duty.199 
                                                                                                                                     
nature of a failed investment which would have been made clearer with the recognition 
of a loss. Thus, Kamin can be seen as an unprovable duty of loyalty case that had to be 
brought as a duty of care case.” Rhee, supra note 61, at 1149 n.56.  
195  By “error,” I do not mean honest mistakes based on hindsight, but instead 
violations of fiduciary duty that go undetected or unproven due to the height of the legal 
hurdles.  
196  See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993); Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
197  See generally Rakesh Khurana & Katharina Pick, The Social Nature of Boards, 70 
BROOK. L. REV. 1259 (2005) (discussing  the social environment of a board and the 
resulting behavior of board members).  
198  See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 2, at 61-79 (discussing structural bias in 
compensation); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith , and Structural 
Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833 (2007) (discussing structural bias in compensation and the Disney 
compensation litigation). See also Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural bias, Special Litigation 
Committees, and the Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305, 1307-09 (2005) 
(discussing “structural bias”).  
199  See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A. 2d 345 (Del. 1993).  
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They routinely retain outside advisers on various matters such as lawyers 
and financial advisers. There are legal requirements on the appointment of 
independent directors,200 the composition of important committees of the 
board,201 and board deliberation procedures.202 
Say-on-pay can counteract structural bias as well. The board gets 
information independent of management control. A board would find it 
uncomfortable to ignore a negative vote of shareholders or employees. 
The sense of public accountability would be great. Ignoring the concern of 
employees, particularly arising from the management ranks, would be 
detrimental to business operations. To do so, the board could be viewed as 
insensitive to employees, which poses a business problem. If excessive 
executive compensation is a possibility due to structural bias, employee 
say-on-pay could offset some of this bias.  
Employee vote can provide cover for the board’s compensation 
decision. A board may want to award high compensation in a facially 
difficult situation for proper reasons. Or, it may not want to award high 
compensation but the social, political, and bargaining situation is complex. 
A normative basis for engaging in compensation negotiation would be 
helpful.203 
Consider a facially difficult situation. The board of a distressed 
company proposes to award a CEO with high compensation. Depending 
on the circumstance, a board could rightly award high compensation to a 
CEO of a troubled company. Management talent would be needed to right 
the ship, and such talent would have opportunity costs. Good executives 
may have other better opportunities and may be wary of entering into a 
bad situation unless the incentives compensate for those foregone 
opportunities. These situations can be politically difficult internally and 
                                                                                                                                     
200  See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange Listing Rule 303A.01 (“Listed companies 
must have a majority of independent directors.”). 
201  See, e.g., id. Listing Rule 303A.04(a) (“Listed companies must have a 
nominating/corporate governance committee composed entirely of independent 
directors.”); id. Listing Rule 303A.05(a) (“Listed companies must have a compensation 
committee composed entirely of independent directors.”). 
202  See, e.g., id. Listing Rule 303A.03 (“To empower non-management directors to 
serve as a more effective check on management, the non-management directors of each 
listed company must meet at regularly scheduled executive sessions without 
management.”). 
203  See G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES 
FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE 89-114 (2d ed. 2006) (suggesting that various kinds of leverage 
exist to bargain successfully).  
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externally. But suppose employees, properly recognizing the situation, 
votes positively. Upon a favorable vote, who can complain?  
Consider the case where a board seeks to reign in compensation for 
rational reasons, but has complex considerations in scaling back executive 
pay.204 Working against the board’s inclination on executive pay may be 
the social bonds between board members and the CEO, a prior history of 
high wages, CEO influence on particular board members such as insider 
members, and a reticence to disturb collegiality. Many of these factors 
create the structural bias in favor of deference to CEOs. In this situation, a 
negative employee vote can give the board leverage in an arms-length 
negotiation, and also provide cover for the decision to reduce 
compensation.   
 
E.  Public Monitoring and Political Legitimization      
 
At current levels, executive compensation is seen by academics, 
politicians, and the public as illegitimate. Controlling the levers of 
corporate power, CEOs have distributed greater portions of the 
corporation’s production to themselves while employees shared less. The 
public has come to view executive compensation as rent extraction gained 
through the power of position, unconstrained by personal qualms. 205 
Executive compensation has become a public issue. In addition to the 
Dodd-Frank Act, there is the possibility of other public reforms. Reform of 
compensation can be done through tax law.206 It can be done through flat 
restrictions or caps on compensation. 207  In the extreme case, the 
government can have a direct role in determining how much an executive 
can pocket in compensation through special taxes or wage control.208  
Employees would serve as public monitors and gatekeepers. Public 
approval is needed to legitimate, socially and politically, high executive 
compensation. Without this legitimacy, boards will continue to feel a 
                                                                                                                                     
204  See PHAN, supra note 16, at 47-62 (presenting a case study of a company and 
board that was highly influenced by the CEO).  
205  See STIGLITZ, supra note 7, at 42 (noting that CEOs have amassed riches through 
“an enhanced ability to take more from the corporation that they are supposed to be 
serving, and weaker qualms about, and enhanced public toleration of, doing so”).  
206  See Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the Taxation of Deferred Compensation, 
85 N.C. L. REV. 571 (2007).  
207  See Ingolf Dittman, Ernst Maug & Dan Zhang, Restricting CEO Pay, 17 J. CORP. 
FIN. 1200 (2011).  
208  See Landon Thomas, Jr., Britain to Levy a One-Time Tax on Banker Bonuses, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 9, 2009).  
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pervasive public pressure even as they continue to award high 
compensation packages. It is difficult to predict how the problem will 
ultimately play out. Will there be further regulatory scrutiny as the divide 
between the very wealthy and the rest increases?  
Even as CEOs are enjoying high compensation, there is longterm 
uncertainty. Social cohesion in a corporation was stronger in the past than 
it is now.209 Current compensation strikes discord in broad constituencies. 
A compensation package should be broadly supported by the many 
constituents of the corporation, including in the broadest sense the public. 
“This is because executive compensation continues to be a hot button 
issue among the unions, community activists, shareholder interests 
groups, and institutional shareholders; it represents a powerful signaling 
device.” 210 Employee say-on-pay can legitimate high executive 
compensation. Suppose the CEO’s pay package was approved by 
shareholders and employees, and informed by the advice a board 
exercises its independent judgment and awards high compensation. What 
would and should the public’s response be?  
 
IV.  OBJECTIONS TO EMPLOYEE SAY   
 
A.  Information Quality              
 
A potential objection to employee say-on-pay would be that 
employee voting would not yield quality information. Instead, the vote 
would be tainted by a number of irrelevant considerations: for example, 
personal feelings toward the CEO, socio-political agendas of individual 
workers or their unions, ignorant or uninformed voting, and class envy. A 
key difference between shareholders and employees is that shareholders 
vote with only criterion in mind—stock value. Employees may apply 
multiple criteria. The objection goes to the reliability of the information 
gotten from the voting results.   
This objection is flawed. A firm is composed of a collection of its 
employees, each holding a unique packet of information. In this respect, a 
firm can be seen as an information market.211 If so, the voting outcome 
                                                                                                                                     
209  See STIGLITZ, supra note 5, at 67.  
210  PHAN, supra note 16, at 154.  
211  See id. at 3 (“There is increasingly realization that a firm is a place where people 
meet to exchange specific information for the purpose of engaging in production.”); 
BARNARD, supra note 175, at 73, 82 (defining an organization as a system of consciously 
coordinated activities persons within must communicate information with each other).  
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would in many cases accurately reflect the collective opinions held.212 
Many opinions may be misguided or ill-informed, but systemic errors are 
difficult to achieve since random errors tend to cancel each other. An 
evaluation on the whole would reflect the overall information held within 
the corporation. 
Although employees may bring different perspectives, their criteria 
would not be random. They would fairly reflect rank in the hierarchy. The 
higher in the hierarchy an employee is, the more the criteria would seek to 
evaluate the CEO’s job performance and the less they would be sensitive 
to wage differential. Greater seniority promotes greater affinity and 
identification with high paying jobs. There may be natural affinity 
(structural bias) toward supporting executive pay.  
At the lower levels, employees may pose a problem arising from 
multiple criteria and perspectives. They are the lowest paid workers, and 
thus would be naturally skeptical of high wages. On average, they may be 
less educated and less informed about the state of the company than their 
managers. They may be influenced by organized labor. They are the 
furthest removed from direct dealings with the CEO. Their evaluations of 
performance may be uninformed or suspect. The risk of the application of 
more diverse criteria is greater in the lower ranks.  
If the lower ranks are problematic, why permit voting at that level? 
Despite the risks, the lowest rank and file employees serve three useful 
functions in the overall scheme. First, there is a benefit to egalitarian 
inclusion of all employees.213 The broader political legitimization function 
of employee say-on-pay would require such voting. From a managerial 
perspective, the exclusion of the majority of employees would be 
demoralizing and undermine organizational cohesion. Second, natural 
skepticism of high compensation, a systematic bias perhaps, would tend 
to offset the structural bias held by senior executives. Third, when a CEO’s 
pay is so large as to absolute amount or wage differential, the expression 
of collective outrage would serve an important public and governance 
function. These benefits outweigh the particular problems at the lower 
rank and file level.  
As discussed earlier, the balance of these considerations suggests a 
weighed voting scheme. Neither rank and file employees nor senior 
executives have the controlling block of votes. That block should be held 
by the middle and senior nonexecutive managerial ranks. The assigned 
                                                                                                                                     
212  See SUROWIECKI, supra note 176.  
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weights acknowledge the potential risks to information quality. One must 
assume that on the whole employees evaluate each other in good faith, 
and that good faith is not dependent on the directionality of the 
evaluation, that is, whether it is top-down or bottom-up. Nor is good faith 
inherently exclusive to senior executives and boards. 
 
B.  Rationally Apathetic Employees               
 
Like political citizens or corporate shareholders, employees may be 
rationally apathetic. Like political voting, employees may think that the 
personal cost-benefit of voting is not worth it, or that their single vote 
(vote allocation) may not make a difference. Some employees may not 
care at all about the issue at stake, or think that they have sufficient 
information to make an informed vote. Some may consider the right a 
chore without any tangible payoff.   
There are significant differences between political or shareholder 
voting and employee voting. In political voting, there is not an 
insignificant cost, which is time off from work or leisure and trekking to 
the voting booth. Employee voting is virtually cost free. Voting can be 
done online. The most significant cost to the employee is the time used to 
weigh the amount of pay with the executive’s performance. This 
consideration, while real, is not time consuming in the mold of performing 
financial analysis, assessing investment opportunities, and such. The 
decision would not require spreadsheets of analyses. It would be in the 
mold of an instantaneous judgment call: Given the company’s 
performance and trajectory and the CEO’s responsibility for them, has the 
CEO earned the proposed compensation? Employees will already have a 
good sense of the company’s performance, trajectory, and the executive’s 
performance. Due to weighed voting, those who have the best information 
have greater voting power, and thus empowering the incentive to vote.  
A problem with the rationally apathetic shareholder is that the 
shareholder may not have very good information on the issues put to 
them. The benefits of diversification increases the work required to be 
informed. If so, this calls into question the informational quality of the 
vote and the motivation to vote. Consider the most basic shareholder 
governance function—voting on directors. Suppose the shareholder holds 
a modestly diversified portfolio of 30 stocks214 and each company has a 
                                                                                                                                     
214  See Meir Statman, How Many Stocks Make a Diversified Portfolio, 22 J. FIN. & QUANT. 
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10-member board with no cross memberships. A shareholder may not 
have good opinions about each of these 300 directors. Rational apathy and 
situational ignorance may be related.   
Employees are situated differently. They know a great deal about the 
company, its competitors, its position in the competitive landscape, and its 
trajectory. In many companies, the information flow within the firm is 
complex and efficient. Like blood in the body, information flows to the 
necessary parts of the firm. Unlike shareholders and the many directors 
and officers in their portfolios, employees will be greater information and 
familiarity with the senior executives of the company. Since they have 
more information and are better informed, and since their voting is almost 
costless, the degree of apathy seen in shareholders will tend to be less in 
employees.  
Lastly, employees are more motivated to vote than shareholders. 
They have undiversified firm-specific investment in their career. 215  In 
cases where employees are vested in their careers and “exit” is far from 
frictionless, 216  they will have incentive to vote and participate. This 
incentive arises from different motivations and sentiments. Voting would 
be almost cost free, and so the degree of shirking would be less. We can 
also assume that as a collective whole, and unless morale has deteriorated, 
employees care about their company and its prospects. The principle of 
meritocracy undergirds the sense of fairness in a competitive market 
society. Thus, employees would be motivated to speak on the issue of 
fairness in wage and sharing of economic production.  
 
C.  Balance in Corporate Governance            
 
In U.S. corporate governance, employees have had little formal role. 
Most boards of public companies do not have employee representatives,217 
                                                                                                                                     
expected variance of 19.21%). See also Robert J. Rhee, The Madoff Scandal, Market 
Regulatory Failure, and the Business Education of Lawyers, 35 J. CORP. L. 363, 372 (2009) 
(suggesting that significant diversification can be achieved with a mix of 30-35  stocks).  
215  See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investments: Explaining Anomalies 
in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 738-39 (2006) (noting that employees make 
undiversified firm-specific investments); ROE & BLAIR, at 58-87.  
216  See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 18, at 21-29 (describing a constituent’s choice of “exit” 
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JOHN T. ADDISON, THE ECONOMICS OF CODETERMINATION: LESSONS FROM THE GERMAN 
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and senior executives typically view their relationship from a hierarchical 
perspective where they transmit information and directives down the 
chain of command. Corporate law does not prohibit a corporation from 
establishing greater employee participation, but this is not the practice 
among public companies. A potential objection may be that employee say-
on-pay would significantly alter the balance of power in corporate 
governance away from the traditional triad of board, management, and 
shareholder. This concern is unfounded.  
If the objection is that employee say-on-pay may influence the board, 
this no objection at all. Legally, say-on-pay does not diminish or change 
the board’s legal authority to manage the business and affairs of the 
corporation.218  It is an advisory vote. At most, say-on-pay exerts soft 
constraints on the board’s virtually unfettered business judgment.  
Ideally, say-on-pay should influence the board. When shareholders 
leave the couch of apathy, their opinion on executive compensation is 
relevant to the mix of information. Likewise, employee opinion is also 
relevant. Unlike the board, employees observe the CEO daily. They 
implement the CEO’s strategies and decisions, and they are in good 
positions to assess the efficacy of corporate decisions, and the CEO’s 
performance and leadership. These points are obvious and 
uncontroversial. If so, why would directors in good faith not want to 
know the opinion of employees in the process of being informed in their 
decisionmaking?  
One can imagine many situations in the past where information from 
employees could have been helpful to the board. Could there have been 
enough honest employees at Enron to give the board pause as to whether 
Jeff Skilling was a good CEO? Would employees at WorldCom, charged 
with integrating the many bad acquisitions the company made, have 
properly expressed their views on Bernie Ebbers’ pay package? Business 
history is replete with many examples when boards could have been 
better served with information held by the collective employees. The 
benefit of such information is particularly acute when there is a 
substantial problem within the firm.   
                                                                                                                                     
EXPERIENCE (2009) (discussing the German model of codetermination in which corporate 
governance is legally shared with employees); ROE & BLAIR, at 163-238; David Charny, 
The German Corporate Governance System, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 145 (1998) (same); 
IRENE LYNCH FANNON, WORKING WITHIN TWO KINDS OF CAPITALISM: CORPORATE 
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218  Dodd-Frank Act § 951.  
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Communicating relevant information to the board is a core function 
of corporate governance. Say-on-pay does not contain complex or 
overwhelming amount of information. Employee say-on-pay does not tilt 
the balance in corporate governance, formally or informally. It is 
consistent with the ideal that boards are the ultimate managers but that 
their decisions should be informed. In the final analysis, the provision of 
relevant information to the board, so long as its assimilation is not so 
taxing as to be counterproductive, is always a good thing.  
 
D.  Employee “Hold Up”              
 
Another objection could be that employee say-on-pay would create 
an employee “hold up” problem. If compensation would depend in part 
on employee approval, the tacit collusion may be that a CEO would be 
incentivized to keep employees happy though this may undermine firm 
profitability and shareholder value. She could raise salaries of employees 
because this would narrow the wage disparity ratio. Or, she might not go 
ahead with needed layoffs because it would be unpopular. Employee say-
on-pay could be used as a coercive “hold up” device.  
There is some merit to the “hold up” objection. If employee approval 
is a factor in pay decisions, CEOs may become more sensitive to the 
happiness and needs of employees. Are marginal increases in the wages of 
corporate employees achieved through implicit quid pro quo such a bad 
thing? With respect to the distribution of the corporation’s gains among 
management, shareholders, and employees—the principal internal 
constituents having claims on the production gains—if employees get a 
little more than they currently get, it should not be a cause for alarm. 
Minimum wage laws do precisely this as between shareholders and 
employees, absent perfect pass-through to customers in the form 
increased prices. It is true that the distributional effect is created by a 
newly formed device of corporate governance. But so what? Currently, 
executives get a lion’s share of the gain from production as among 
employees.219 This raises an issue of equity and fairness in the corporate 
enterprise. Laws often have such effect, including corporation law. 220 
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There are many corporations in history 221  and currently 222  that pay 
employees very well. A distributional effect from the current baseline is 
not objectionable per se.  
The “hold up” would become a bigger problem if CEOs are in effect 
substantially captured by employees such that there are significant 
questions of efficiency. Large business decisions and strategies—such as 
mergers, layoffs, strategic outsourcing, labor contracts, etc.—should be 
made in the interest of the corporate enterprise223 and not to the parochial 
interests of management or labor. A merger not consummated to protect 
employee interests may be just as bad a merger consummated to increase 
the CEO’s empire and pay. But the risk of these concerns is minimal.  
Firstly, rank and file employees should not be given the controlling 
block of votes. The managerial ranks should be given the controlling block. 
By virtue of a pyramidal corporate hierarchy, these employees constitute a 
minority in numbers. They are already higher paid than most employees 
in the firm. They are managers, think like managers, and would vote like 
managers.  
In important transactions, the considerations and influencing factors 
may be much greater than the isolated interplay between management 
and employees. CEOs report to the board. They are subject to market 
pressures such as stock price, activist shareholders, and Wall Street. They 
are influenced by the market for corporate control. 224  Like other 
employees, they are influenced by concerns for their professional 
                                                                                                                                     
1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (ruling that bondholders have no recourse for lost value when the 
corporation engages in a leverage buyout); Katz v. Oak Industries Inc., 508 A.2d 873 
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Objective Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235 (2002).  
224  See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 
110 (1965).  
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reputations and the next job, which is the market process of ex post 
“settling up.”225  
Assume, for example, the CEO is forced to do the one thing that will 
alienate employees the most—layoffs. As a result, disaffected employees 
vote against the CEO’s pay package, which is large because the board felt 
it needed to incentivize a talented CEO and pay for her opportunity cost. 
Two years have passed, and the drastic move turned out to the right one. 
The company was saved and is moving toward financial health again. 
Would a board deciding on compensation be able to put the negative 
employee vote in the context of the situation and make an informed, 
independent judgment on the merit of the pay? Yes, a professional board, 
acting on an informed basis, would be able to contextualize the negative 
vote by employees. One also suspects that in reporting process, the senior 
management, the only internal group that has routine board access, would 
duly explain why employees are unhappy with management and why 
this unhappiness is not correlated with the best interest of the corporation.  
In the final analysis, employee “hold up” at the margins is a good 
thing or fairly harmless on the whole. Wage increases across the economy 
might be a good thing since more equitable distribution of wealth may be 
more efficient. 226  When there is a fundamental conflict between the 
preferences of employees and corporate actions, employee “hold up” is 
simply one of many factors that influence the CEO and that a board must 
consider in determining executive compensation.  
 
E.  Political Objections       
 
If this Article reaches beyond academic discourse and into the public 
sphere, as is the hope of any scholar seeking worldly influence, there will 
be another objection. The most visceral objection may come from a 
conviction that employees have no place in opining on the pay packages 
of senior executives. Some CEOs may be threatened by the notion that 
employees would be evaluating them and approving their pay packages. 
There may be strongly held convictions on social and political order 
                                                                                                                                     
225  See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 
288, 295-306 (1980) (suggesting that labor market should create proper incentives through 
“ex post settling up”). But see Rhee, supra note 61, at 1176 (arguing that “the current 
problem of excessive executive compensation calls into question whether this ‘settling up’ 
process is efficient, or even works when the amount of compensation diminishes an 
executive's long-term incentives”).  
226  See supra note 8.  
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among some economic and business communities. These strong objections 
would coalesce into a concentrated political interest group, which would 
vigorously advocate against employee say-on-pay.227 This is the political 
reality. Senior executives as a political interest group have not embraced 
the concept of shareholder say-on-pay. Employee say-on-pay would run 
into strong political headwinds. This objection is relevant as a pragmatic 
matter. However, I do not believe that the politics of reform would be the 
death knell of an otherwise good idea.  
The idea of employee say-on-pay is pragmatic and politically feasible. 
As with any major reform, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or the Dodd-
Frank Act, a public perception of the necessity of reform drives the 
legislative process. The idea of employee say-on-pay will be prominent in 
the academic and policy debate because it is legally and economically 
sound in theory. One cannot predict the brew of political, economic and 
social circumstances that would overwhelm strong political opposition. It 
could be that social inequity reaches an intolerable point or another 
corporate or financial crisis occurs, galvanizing further reform.  
Also, the debate on executive pay is a global one. The idea of 
employee say may have appeal in other parts of the economically 
advanced world. Shareholder say-on-pay was first implement in the U.K. 
and then rapidly adopted in continental Europe and other common law 
countries, including now the U.S. In other developed economies in Europe, 
the role of employees and labor in corporate governance is more 
prominent than in the U.S. It is conceivable that employee say-on-pay may 
be adopted first in other parts of the world, and then later imported into 
America as was the case with shareholder say-on-pay. The fact that say-
on-pay as a corporate governance phenomenon has been so widely 
adopted across advanced economies suggest that there are limits to the 
political power of corporate executives. That limitation also suggests that 




                                                                                                                                     
227  Berle and Means saw early the political dimensions of business, and 
characterized business leaders as tinged with sovereign-like qualities. See ADOLF A. BERLE 
& GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (reprint ed. 
1991) (“The power attendant to such concentration has brought forth princes of industry, 
whose position in the community has yet to be defined.”); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom 
Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1932) (suggesting 
that corporate executives operate “more as princes and ministers than as promoters or 
merchants”).  
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Few would dispute that in most companies the CEO should be the 
highest paid employee, that they should be well compensated compared 
to others for good performance, and that they should be entitled to 
personal wealth after a lengthy successful tenure. However, the pay of a 
single senior employee in a corporation raises the issue of corporate 
efficiency and income inequity, and the broader spillover of these issues in 
the public and political discourse. The case for employee say-on-pay is 
compelling. Employees can monitor senior executive performance better 
than shareholders because they possess inside information, and they have 
direct incentive to monitor. Employee say-on-pay is feasible and cost 
effective. Employee input leverages all of the information held in the 
corporation, and it can assist the board in making an informed decision on 
executive pay. Employee approval can also politically legitimize executive 
compensation in an era in which executive pay and income inequity have 
touched public consciousness.  
The benefits of employee say-on-pay outweigh the objections. 
Concerns about information quality can be controlled through weighed 
voting. Employee say-on-pay does not fundamentally shift the balance of 
power in corporate governance. Legal power still resides with the board, 
but the board must now consider additional relevant factors in making an 
informed decision. The interests of shareholders and employees are not 
categorically inimical to each other. The use of employee input can be 
used to advance the interest of shareholders in insuring that executive pay 
is coupled to performance and does not reach grossly excessive levels. 
